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“It is a melancholy reflection that what is of the most universal importance, is most universally
neglected – I mean keeping up the credit of money.”
-
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INTRODUCTION

On June 8, 1783, George Washington, the Commander in Chief of the Continental Army,
sent a letter to all state legislatures of the United States regarding the matters facing the new nation.
Since 1775, Washington had managed the strategic operations of the Continental Army through
“many anxious days and watchful nights.”1 Prior to entering a “state of undisturbed repose,”
Washington offered his perspectives to all citizens on important issues pertaining to the
“tranquility of the United States.”2 While the United States won the War of Independence,
Washington believed that domestic instabilities remained a pressing conundrum for state
legislators. Ultimately, Washington realized that some state legislators were reluctant to fully
capitulate to the authority of the Continental Congress. Washington believed that if state
legislatures did not delegate power to Congress, the perpetual union would succumb to “Anarchy
and confusion,” and would fail to “regulate and govern the general concerns of the Confederated
Republic.”3 In effect, Washington believed that this union would allow the United States to remain
an independent nation.
Washington concluded that a permanent union between the state legislatures and Congress
would thwart political corruption, and would maintain the independency of America. Through this
“Washington’s Circular Letter of Farwell to the Army, June 8, 1783,” Library of Congress,
www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/peace
/circular.html (accessed August 30, 2017).
1

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

6

7

indissoluble merger, Washington also believed that the country would be able to serve the public
by resolving the country’s debts to domestic and foreign creditors, and “earnestly inculcate”
economic stability among all citizens. After serving the public in a military capacity, Washington
argued that state legislators must properly recompense soldiers for their valor, and repay creditors
for their altruism. He referred to these public compensations as a “debt of honor and of gratitude”
that would allow these public servants to “reap the fruit of his labours.” Specifically, Washington
asserted that Congress’ reluctance to recompense soldiers for their service cheated the
Continentals. Although state legislatures struggled to repay public creditors due to the limited
supply of monetary reserves, Washington viewed Congress’ unwillingness to allocate annual
payments to soldiers, especially Continental officers, as a disgrace.4 During the war, citizens and
legislators constantly debated the issuance of service pensions. The discourse was especially
acrimonious in Connecticut. For example, three of Connecticut’s Congressional delegates, Roger
Sherman, Samuel Huntington, and Oliver Wolcott, provided their united opinion on the question
of service entitlements to Governor Jonathan Trumbull. On May 18, 1778, the Connecticut
delegates wrote a letter to Governor Trumbull noting that disagreement over the institution of
service pensions was “the most painful and disagreeable question that hath ever been agitated in
Congress.”5 Sherman, Huntington, and Wolcott’s letter suggested that legislators were more
concerned with recompensing public creditors and controlling debt, than dispensing entitlements
to soldiers. Yet, Washington insisted that service pensions would prevent a “total dereliction of
the Service.”6 Regardless of whether or not Congress believed that service gratuities were odious
4

“Washington’s Circular Letter of Farwell to the Army, June 8, 1783,” Library of Congress.

“The Connecticut Delegates to the Governor of Connecticut (Jonathan Trumbull), May 18, 1778,” in
Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, ed. Edmund C. Burnett, Volume III, (Washington, D.C.: The
Carnegie Institution of Washington), 1926, 255-256.
5
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“Washington’s Circular Letter of Farwell to the Army, June 8, 1783,” Library of Congress.
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in that it added to the public debt, Washington maintained that soldiers’ service pensions were
analogous to “the price of their blood and of your independency.”7
Although Washington’s 1783 circular letter to the state legislatures declared that while he
supported service pensions, he also advocated against this entitlement during the war. In November
1777, Washington noted in his personal writings that service entitlements would be
“impracticable.”8 Despite a surge in desertions, and a clear decline in a number of Continentals’
morale during the winter of 1778, Washington justified his stance by recording the potential
reactions of ordinary people, as well as the impact service gratuities would have on the country’s
debt. In terms of public backlash, Washington believed that service entitlements would create
perpetual dissentions between civilians and Continental volunteers. As Marjoleine Kars argues,
ordinary colonists who sought economic autonomy, and resisted imperial oppression, fueled the
Revolutionary War. While the Crown continued to implement oppressive policies among the
American Colonies, middling colonists rebelled against impartial local governments, and
excessive taxation.9 Washington feared that if Congress were to authorize service remunerations
to all soldiers, payments would eventually create a partial social distinction between Continentals
and commoners, who resisted imperial tyranny through local militia groups and committees of
safety. In terms of the country’s deficit, Washington deemed service entitlements as another
7

“Washington’s Circular Letter of Farwell to the Army, June 8, 1783,” Library of Congress.

“Remarks on Plan of Field Officers for Remodeling the Army, November 1777,” in The Writings of
George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, Hathi Trust Digital, Volume 10, October 1933, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office), 126, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=msu.31293001055601;view=1up;seq=
189 (accessed November 3, 2017).
8
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Marjoleine Kars, Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North
Carolina (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press), 2002, 6.
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expenditure that would “sink the Colonies under the load of it.”10 In an effort to balk popular
uproar, as well as thwart further economic stagnation, Washington initially opposed service
gratuities for Continentals.
The evolution in Washington’s stance toward service entitlements altered through his
leadership of the Continental Army, as well as his experience in dealing with a growing sense of
disobedience among Continental regiments. In January 1778, a committee on Army affairs for the
Continental Congress proposed the ratification of an entitlement legislation that sought to
remunerate all Continental officers, who served till the end of the war, with half-pay for life.11 In
a letter to Henry Laurens, the fifth President of the Continental Congress, Washington argued that
half-pay pensions would lead to the “salvation of the cause.”12 Washington suggested that if the
Continental Congress authorized an entitlement program that provided financial security to
officers, it would enable these Continentals to secure economic opportunity following the war,
thus maintaining the health of the union. Despite Washington’s idyllic view toward lifelong service
payments for officers, political opposition remained strong. For example, Laurens believed that
half-pay pensions would lead to larger taxes on the citizenry in order to pay for this social
expenditure, and would virtually create an officer corps aristocracy.13 As opposition continued in
10
“Remarks on Plan of Field Officers for Remodeling the Army, November 1777,” in The Writings of
George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 126.
11

William H. Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States, ed. David Kinley, (New York:
Oxford University Press), 1918, 25.
“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 10 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, last
modified February 1, 2018, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0430 (accessed February
2, 2018).
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“Henry Laurens to William Livingston, April 19, 1778,” in Letters of Members of the Continental
Congress, ed. Edmund C. Burnett, Volume III, (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Institution of Washington), 1926,
176-178.
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Congress, many Continental officers feared that their service pensions would never become
legitimate. In December 1782, an officer corps stationed in Newburgh, New York sent a memorial
to Congressional delegates insisting that entitlements were an “honorable and just recompense for
several years hard service.”14 In the same token, Henry Knox, Jedidiah Huntington, among other
commanders of the Connecticut Line argued that “any further experiments,” that attempted to
hesitantly compensate the impatient officers, could lead to “fatal effects.”15 As delegates failed to
construct entitlement legislation, the Newburgh officers’ address seemed more like a threat to the
Continental Congress. Because Congress hesitated to authorize life pensions for officers, some
delegates believed that a military coup d’état was foreseeable. As talks of peace emerged with the
Crown, Congress reluctantly passed the Commutation Act on March 22, 1783 that sought to
provide five years payment, in money or securities, to all Continental officers.16 Washington’s
eventual support of service entitlements arose out of sympathy toward the fact that soldiers’
financial security remained dubious following the war, and an effort to prevent a military threat on
Congressional delegates.
While Washington’s eventual support of service pensions gave officers a sense of
assurance following the war, an economic downturn undermined the Commutation Act. High
taxes, coupled with the injustices of service entitlements, led to unrelenting public outrage.
Specifically, service pension protestors in Farmington, Connecticut believed that the Commutation
Act reduced the regular standing army, and commoners, to a subservient level against officers. In
“The Address and Petition of the Officers of the Army of the United States, December 1782,” in Journals
of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, ed. Gaillard Hunt, Library of Congress, Volume XXIV, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office), 1922, 291-292.
14

15
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Ibid.

Laura Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 2003, 60.
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order to procure Commutation payments, state legislatures were forced to increase taxes. As
money remained scarce, ordinary Americans fell deeper into impoverishment, and dissenters
believed that the entitlement statute gave officers an unfair social distinction among Continental
privates, and militia volunteers.17 By 1790, Congress’s entitlement legislation failed due to
opposition from ordinary Americans and state legislators, as well as the lack of monetary reserves
to recompense officers. However, contentions over social standing remained at the forefront of
service entitlements.18 The evidence of rationing martial goods for impoverished soldiers, and
discrepancies in soldiers’ compensation records reveals that the social and wealth distribution of
the Connecticut Line was diverse. Social historians of the Revolutionary War interpret the social
and economic composition of the Continental Army in a variety of ways. While some insist that
the majority of soldiers came from elite landholding backgrounds, other historians assert that there
were far less soldiers from prominent Anglo-American families based on tax assessment data.
Although there has not been a comprehensive analysis on the social and wealth distribution
of the Connecticut Line, a number of historians have examined the stark social and economic
divisions within different states’ regiments legitimized by the Continental Congress. Mark E.
Lender argues that the officer corps for the New Jersey Line predominately hailed from elite
landholding families in America. According to Lender, “fully 84 percent of the New Jersey officers
came from the wealthiest third of the state’s population.”19 In addition, Lender asserts that nearly
Solomon Whitman, “At a Meeting of the Inhabitants of the Town of Farmington, on the Fourth Day of
August, 1783,” Connecticut Courant, August 12, 1783, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.providence.idm.oclc.org
(accessed October 5, 2017).
17

18

Jensen, 62.

19
Mark E. Lender, “The Enlisted Line: The Continental Soldiers of New Jersey,” (Ph.D. dissertation,
Rutgers University, 1975), 128-129.
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a third of the continental officers were from the state’s “richest tenth,” and represented the “flower
of society.” 20 Furthermore, Lender claims that none of the New Jersey officers came from lowertier segments of New Jersey’s population. A number of historians, such as James Kirby Martin,
and Ray Raphael, incorporated Lender’s analysis on the Continental Army’s officer corps into
their own scholarly work. Raphael asserts that “with the exception of the officers, most of the longterm soldiers were boys and men of little wealth.”21 In addition, Lender collaborated with James
Kirby Martin in a 2006 book entitled, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic,
1763 – 1789, that includes tax and property wealth data from Lender’s dissertation. Ultimately,
Lender and Martin assert that “overall [the officers] were no different in socioeconomic
composition and personal accomplishments than their fellow Revolutionaries in state legislatures
and Congress.”22 Lender, Martin, and Raphael argue that the majority of officers were members
of America’s social elite.
Charles Royster, on the other hand, places a greater emphasis on the wealth variance in the
Continental Army. Royster describes the role of enrollment requirements for rising officers from
middling backgrounds. According to Royster, the ability of colonists to raise a company of soldiers
provided an avenue for higher status, despite their humble origins. 23 Furthermore, he asserts that
20

Lender, “The Enlisted Line,” 128-129.

Ray Raphael, A People’s History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight
for Independence (New York: Perennial), 2002, 82.
21
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James Kirby Martin and Mark E. Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic,
1763 – 1789, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 2006), 108.
23
Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775
– 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 1979, 64. Royster incorporates a passage from the
memoirs of John Lacey, a Brigadier-General in the Pennsylvania militia, to argue that the majority of officers were
not from affluent origins. Lacey acknowledged that the majority of his fellow officers were “Sons of Farmers or
Mechaniks, who had quit the Plow or the Workshop (Royster, A Revolutionary People at War, 87).

13

if working class men fulfilled the Continental Army’s enrollment requirements, these men could
encourage their neighbors to join their companies, and secure their posts as officers. Royster
concludes that the social and economic status of the rank-and-file of the Continental Army was
more diverse then previously measured by historians, because the majority of officers were day
laborers of middling, or poverty-stricken origins.24 In addition to unraveling the significance of
enrollment requirements for rising officers from working class backgrounds, Royster counters
Lender’s argument on the social status of the Continental Army officers by emphasizing that “the
revolutionaries did not have enough gentlemen to go around.”25 Similarly, John Shy asserts that
commentators of the war “noted that American officers often were not gentlemen.”26 Shy claims
in A People Numerous and Armed that approximately 15,000 and 20,000 Americans became
officers in the Continental Army, as well as the colonial militia units. However, the dangers of
fighting in the Continental force detracted many elite landholding Americans from enlisting. Shy
argues that “military service in the Revolution deflected life not only outward but inward.”27
Ultimately, Royster and Shy illustrate that a profound segment of the officer corps were from
middling, or poverty-stricken backgrounds.
A number of scholars conclude that the majority of Continental soldiers hailed from elite
Anglo-American families that owned a vast amount of acreage, and were financially prosperous.
However, Royster and Shy counter this argument by indicating the importance of enrollment
24

Royster, 86.

25

Ibid., 87.

26

John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American
Independence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 1990, 251.
27

Ibid.
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requirements, and the ordinary colonists’ ability to receive commissions for fulfilling enrollment
quotas.28 In addition to Royster and Shy, in 2014, Derrick Lapp re-examined the Maryland Line’s
social composition to analyze whether or not the majority of soldiers within this segment of the
Continental Army were elite landowners. By incorporating consensus and tax data from the lateeighteenth century, Lapp asserts that a larger segment of the Maryland Line’s officer corps
originated from a middling socioeconomic backgrounds.29 Ultimately, Lapp successfully argues
that the social composition of Maryland’s citizenry, as well as the state’s land and monetary
inflation, contributed to more than twenty-five percent of the Maryland officers originating from
working class, or financially impoverished backgrounds.30 Lapp incorporates a great deal of his
statistical findings from Gregory Stiverson’s examination on inequalities in tax levies, and
property holding, among the Maryland citizenry following the War of Independence. Stiverson
gathers wealth data from 1783 tax assessments from various Maryland counties, and showed the
stark social and economic divisions through statistical figures.31 While Lapp included Stiverson’s
economic analysis in his dissertation, he predominately hones in on two officers within the
Maryland Line to illustrate the social, and financial, divisions within the colony’s regiment.
Ultimately, Lapp’s dissertation argues against the narrative that the Continental Army’s officer
corps were predominately from elite landowning families.32

28

Shy, 251.

Derick E. Lapp, Did They Really “Take None But Gentlemen”? Henry Hardman, the Maryland Line, and
a Reconsideration of the Socioeconomic Composition of the Continental Officer Corps, Journal of Military History,
2014, 1241, http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=d2ec0574-69fe-4267-ac48
-5797fbe5ab79%40sessionmgr4006 (accessed August 20, 2017).
29

30

Ibid., 1251.

31

Gregory A. Stiverson, Poverty in the Land of Plenty: Tenancy in Eighteenth-Century Maryland
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1977, 144 – 147.
32

Lapp, 1251.
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Lapp and Stiverson’s focus on officer and soldier compensation allows them to measure
the wealth variance among the Maryland Line, as well as soldiers’ social and economic
composition following the War of Independence. Similarly, Laura Jensen analyzes the
development of America’s entitlement policies from the onset of the Revolutionary War through
the Civil War. While examining land and monetary entitlement benefits for veterans, Jensen argues
that America’s leaders did not struggle to develop social programs following the Revolutionary
War.33 Jensen reveals that the Federal Government first developed entitlement programs in 1776.
While she asserts that veteran pensions and land entitlements were integral social policies for many
soldiers and their families, Jensen exposes the shortcomings and inequities of these service
remunerations.34 While the Commutation Act failed, ordinary citizens believed Congressional
delegates had been coerced by unpredictable officers. 35 Jensen argues that the Commutation notes
had a twofold impact. First, the shortage of currency in the American economy led to these bonds
holding an uncertain market value. Similar to other risky government securities during the lateeighteenth century, a number of officers eventually sold their Commutation notes at a discounted
value to speculators who hoped to strengthen their investment portfolios.36 Second, Congress’s
decision to solely bestow Commutation notes to officers sparked discord between low-to-middle
income laborers, and elite landholders. Poor farmers and mechanics, who did not qualify as
33

Jensen, 10. Jensen argues that inequalities in service remunerations remained for thirty-four years after
the legislative attempt at Commutation Notes. It was not until the ratification of the Federal Pension Act of 1818 that
the regular standing army could apply for an entitlement from the Federal Government. However, Jensen reveals
that the Office of War Department improperly assessed a number of pension applicants’ financial stability. She
suggests that veterans who did not state that they were disabled struggled to receive an entitlement in comparison to
applicants with physical impairments. Furthermore, Jensen argues that all Revolutionary War veterans were not
guaranteed an equal chance at receiving a pension until the revision of the entitlement statute in 1832.
34

Ibid.

35

Ibid., 60.

36

Ibid., 64.
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beneficiaries of Commutation notes, believed that these payments were unjust in that
Congressional delegates, and state legislators, failed to adequately compensate poverty-stricken
veterans.37 Although the majority of Revolutionary veterans neared the end of their lives, Congress
finally allowed surviving Continentals to apply to receive pension annuities in 1818. However,
Jensen carefully critiques the social policy’s flaws, specifically the assessment procedure that
prevented a number elderly, and destitute, veterans from receiving a just remuneration.38
While Jensen argues that Congress’s ratification of the 1818 pension legislation led to the
creation of future welfare programs, she suggests that a number of poverty-stricken soldiers
struggled to receive fair payments due to the assessors’ inability to properly assess the financial
stability of its veteran pension applicants.39 Similar to Jensen’s examination of social policy
legislation, Woody Holton examines the role of market forces following the Revolutionary War,
as well as ordinary Americans contentions with Congress, and their respective state legislators.
Holton’s analysis reveals that working class Americans believed that the American economy’s
recession in the 1780s was rooted from the state government’s disruptive economic policies, such
as regressive taxes, poorly constructed debt-relief initiatives, and the shortage of specie in
circulation.40 For example, Holton identifies that as the money supply tightened in the 1780s, land
lost approximately two-thirds of its value, and livestock prices fell by fifty percent. A number of
low-to-middle income Americans were irate with the federal and state governments’ decision to
37

Jensen, 62.

38

Ibid., 82.

39

Ibid., 118.

40

Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang),

2007, 30.
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support an economic ceiling on specie to allow Congress and state governments’ to pay back
private creditors’ debts for loaning goods and specie to the Continental Army.41 In addition to
examining the market forces that caused the economic recession of the late-eighteenth century,
Holton traces the speculative investment practices for Revolutionary War veterans’ service bonds,
or Consolidated notes. According to Holton, the speculation behind these bonds contributed to the
economic slump following the war. During the Revolutionary War, colonists lent specie to the
government, army contractors, and soldiers. Eventually, these funds were converted into bonds.
Holton asserts that practically every soldier in the Continental Army received these war bonds for
their service following the war.42 However, these securities were worth only a fraction of their
face-value. While some veterans held onto these debt certificates, a number of poor farmers and
urban mechanics sold these undervalued bonds out of disappointment. The soldiers’ inequitable
compensation led to a large segment of low-to-middle income Americans protesting against
Congress and the state governments’ inability to resolve the economic slump following the
Revolutionary War.43
For decades, historians have debated the extent of the social and economic divisions within
the Continental Army. While Lender, Martin, and Raphael contend that the Continental Army was
predominately composed of elite landholding men from prominent Anglo-American backgrounds,
a number of historians have countered this scholarly argument.44 Lapp’s dissertation utilizes
wealth and tax data to argue that a much larger segment of the Continental Army was composed
41

Holton, 31.

42

Holton, 33.

43

Ibid.

44

Lapp, 1241.
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of working class Americans who became vulnerable to financially and physically toilsome effects
of the war, as well as the economic slump during the late-eighteenth century.45 In addition, Jensen’s
analysis of the development of America’s entitlement policies indicates why the selective, and
error-prone nature of the Pension Act of 1818 crippled already-impoverished veterans. Evidently,
these pension applications showcased that the wealth gap within the Continental Army was much
more profound than previously thought by scholars.46 In addition, Holton’s examination of the role
of ordinary Americans dealing with the state governments’ disruptive economic policies indicates
that the economic recession augmented veterans’ economic instability, specifically poor farmers
and urban mechanics. Ultimately, Holton concludes that asset taxes, inefficient debt-relief
initiatives, and the shortage of specie in circulation, amplified working class veterans’ inability to
stabilize their financial livelihoods.47 The socioeconomic divisions with the Continental Army
cannot be minimized. Furthermore, the recessionary market forces and payment discrepancies
recorded in officers’ orderly books indicate that the socioeconomic composition of the Connecticut
Line was striking.
Middling, as well as poverty-stricken farmers and mechanics were at the heart of the
American Revolution, and were the daring laborers that eventually comprised the majority of the
Continental Army. Although no scholar has undertaken a comprehensive analysis on the social
and wealth distribution of the Connecticut Line, I did so by constructing a set of case studies on
Connecticut soldiers, unveiling the impact of rationing techniques on low-to-middle income
soldiers, incorporating why market forces effected the financial security of Connecticut
45

Lapp, 1251.

46

Jensen, 82.

47

Holton, 30.
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Continentals, as well as analyzing discrepancies in soldiers’ compensation records. My aim in this
thesis is to explain that the social and economic distribution of the Connecticut Line was diverse,
and argue that the Continental Army’s wealth disparity between the rich and the poor was far more
profound than previously suggested by scholars.
Farmers, bricklayers, sawyers, among other physically arduous laborers, cannot be
forgotten in the shadow of the Early American meritocracy. Despite the absence of tax assessment
data, Connecticut soldiers’ affidavits on their financial stance and service, as well as soldiers’ asset
valuations, appraised by county court administrators following the ratification of the Pension Act
of 1818, reveal the social and economic contrast within the Connecticut Line. After gathering
Connecticut soldiers’ pension records form the National Archive’s digitized microfilm pension
proceedings, I aggregate quantitative, and qualitative data, for thirty-six soldiers in Microsoft
Excel. By comparing service tenure, annual service gratuity, rank, occupation, and total asset value
among Connecticut beneficiaries, I reveal the extent of the Connecticut Line’s social diversity, and
its impoverishment gap.
In an effort to show the extent of the poverty gap in the Connecticut Line, I have placed an
emphasis on discrepancies in Connecticut soldiers’ compensation records. Chapter 1 analyzes the
effects of provisional rationing, and inequities in medical services among Connecticut
Continentals. Connecticut officers’ orderly books, and paymasters’ rationing account books,
reveal that a number of soldiers within the Connecticut Line did not receive equivalent clothing
and equipment rations. In addition, a surgeon’s journal entries indicates that medical attention was
skewed against impoverished soldiers throughout the war. However, while instances of despair
and disobedience arose from commanding officers’ rationing techniques, a number of poor farmers
and urban mechanics continued to fight for the Continental Army in an effort to eventually receive

20

adequate compensations for their service. Ultimately, commanders’ inequivalent provisions left
many poverty-stricken, and middling soldiers faced with financial hardships as the war came to a
close.
The economic downturn of the 1780s prevented many poor farmers and urban mechanics
from overcoming the debilitating impact of provisional rationing. Chapter 2 shows how
inflationary market forces affected the entire citizenry, especially poor farmers and urban
mechanics who served in the Connecticut Line. In an effort to repay private creditors, state
legislators devised a number of debt relief legislations that crippled low-to-middle income
Americans. As the supply of specie contracted, a number of Connecticut veterans were stuck in a
poverty trap. Chapter 2 also considers the public’s reaction to the inflationary economy, and the
failure of state legislatures to indemnify impoverished soldiers through risky securities. Ordinary
citizens believed that the state assemblies’ monetary policies devastated the American economy,
and criticized elite misrule following the Revolutionary War. By allowing government bond
speculation, and adhering to private creditors’ demands, state legislators and Congressional
delegates were criticized for not properly allocating funds toward indigent soldiers.
Eventually, as Chapter 3 shows, Connecticut’s debt-relief legislation deteriorated labor
productivity among low-to-middle income Connecticut inhabitants, especially veterans of the
Revolutionary War. Despite Congress’s ratification of the Pension Act of 1818, an entitlement
program headed by the Office of War Department, a number of surviving Connecticut veterans
did not receive equitable benefits. Rather, an aggregation of a socially and economically diverse
population of Connecticut soldiers revealed that pension assessors examined applicants on their
social standing, and, in a number of cases, granted insubstantial payments to the most
impoverished veterans. By identifying the parallels and contrasts between middling, and poverty-
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stricken soldiers’ payment discrepancies, I illuminate the extent of social diversity, the
impoverishment gap, and the discrepancies in material provisions and remunerations among
Connecticut Continentals. This social economic historical piece is a testament to the grievances,
and financial hardships, of ordinary citizens during a period of unprecedented rebellion and
uncertainty.

CHAPTER 1: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMPOSITION
OF THE CONNECTICUT LINE

Josias Poheague, a Native American soldier for the first and fifth regiments of the
Connecticut Line, was one of twenty-two documented Connecticut soldiers who died during the
Battle of Yorktown in 1781.48 On May 8, 1783, the Connecticut Committee of Payable issued a
postmortem military pay voucher for Poheague’s “services incurred for the United States.”49 The
voucher indicated that Poheague resided in Stonington, Connecticut, and served from 1777 until
1781. While there is no way to confirm Poheague’s total assets, nor his occupation in the
committee’s order, his residency on Long Island Sound indicated that he was most likely a
maritime laborer who took up arms against Great Britain.50 Poheague’s voucher, which totaled
forty pounds and eighteen pence, presented a rudimentary sketch of his economic livelihood.
Poheague appears to have left little behind. Over the course of his life, he faded in and out
of his commanding officers’ muster rolls, pay rolls, daily commands in officers’ orderly books, as
well as the town of Stonington’s genealogical registers. However, the Committee of Payable’s
1783 voucher, as well as the Connecticut Adjutant-General’s Office’s 1889 service record, allows
for a sharper picture of Poheague’s social and economic situation prior to his death. Poheague
initially joined the Connecticut Line as a non-commissioned private on February 22, 1777, and
48
“American Casualties at Yorktown,” National Park Service, February 26, 2015,
https://www.nps.gov/york/learn/historyculture/american-casualties-at-yorktown.htm (accessed September 1, 2017).

“Connecticut Committee of Payable Remittance to Josias Poheague, May 8, 1783,” Military Pay
Vouchers, 1783, 99190 (Sheet 1), Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford, Connecticut.
49

50

Ibid.
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served in Captain James Eldridge’s Stonington Company until late-December 1780. The
Connecticut Adjunct-General’s service record indicated that he then served as a noncommissioned private within Captain Asahel Hodge’s Company from January 1, 1781 to his death
on October 16, 1781.51 Although Poheague was a Native American who fought throughout the
Revolutionary War, he was not an anomaly within the rank-and-file of the Continental Army. The
enlistment of indigenous peoples was an integral component of the success of the Continental
Army.52 While Poheague’s service record depicted his faithfulness to the Continental Army, as
well as its ethnic diversity, the Connecticut Committee of Payable’s postmortem voucher failed to
properly recompense Poheague’s beneficiaries.
Poheague’s payment certificate was unusual in its composition compared to compensation
records used by scholars, such as officers’ orderly book tables, and service entitlements from the
federal government. Joseph Plumb Martin, a Connecticut farmer who served for seven years as a
private within the Connecticut Line, revealed in his memoir that while payments were rarely
distributed to soldiers during the war, a Continental voucher usually translated into specie, and
51
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entitled a soldier to a discount for a specified good, such as clothing, staple foods, and land. 53
However, Poheague’s voucher did not indicate either one of these guarantees. Instead, this order
specified that the committee appointed Captain Phineas Stanton, an officer for the Connecticut
Line, to administer the “intestate estate of Josias Poheague,” as well as handle his “bonds taken as
the law directs.”54 According to the order, Poheague’s death allowed for an officer in the
Connecticut Line to administer the sale of his Stonington property, and redeem his payment.
Poheague’s voucher epitomized the inequities that many Connecticut soldiers dealt with during,
and following, the Revolutionary War.
Poheague’s postmortem pay voucher represented a first-hand account of the subtle, yet
pervasive payment discrepancies toward a number of Continentals. The Committee of Payable
assigned Phineas Stanton, an elite landholding resident of Stonington, as the bearer of Poheague’s
payment, and the administrator of Poheague’s acreage in New London County.55 According to
Richard Anson Wheeler’s genealogical register, Stanton served as a British captain during the
Seven Years’ War in Nova Scotia. He also served as a Stonington deputy from 1760 to 1771.
Although Stanton was sixty-four at the time of the Committee of Payable’s voucher, he was still
an influential businessman in Stonington. Yet, why was Stanton assigned as the bearer of
Poheague’s rightful voucher? For one thing, the voucher did not indicate that Poheague had a
family. However, a 1785 preamble passed by the Connecticut General Assembly revealed that
Stonington land agents sought Poheague’s acreage for a reconstruction of New London County’s
53
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“bridges and roads” in order to develop a more efficient public mail route.56 According to
genealogical records, Paul Wheeler, Edward Hancox, and Stanton were instructed by two
“representatives of Stonington” to “measure the highway from Long Point to New London” in
order to “raise three hundred pounds lawful money, to enable them to build a bridge across the
cove, called Lambert’s Cove, from Pine Point to Quanaduct.”57 And while there is no record of
exactly where Poheague’s designated acreage was located in Stonington, the Committee of
Payable’s decision to name Stanton as the bearer of Poheague’s voucher showcased AngloAmerican infringement on rightful indigenous land, as well as a disturbing compensation
inequity.58
Prior to the existence of payment discrepancies among Connecticut soldiers, men like
Poheague were eager to join the Continental force due to the provisions promised to them. In
addition to settlement certificates that could later be sold to obtain clothing and money, all soldiers
were ensured adequate daily rations of goods. According to Joseph Plumb Martin, soldiers were
promised, upon enlistment, “one pound of good and wholesome fresh or salt beef, or three fourths
of a pound of good salt pork, a pound of good flour,” among other staple goods. In addition, Martin
noted that privates were promised “six dollars and two thirds a month,” upon enlistment. For poor
farmers and urban mechanics, these provisions proved to be an unmatched selling point.59 In
addition to these procurements, camaraderie drove men to join. After registering as a soldier,
56
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Martin described an unprecedented sense of “liveliness” among enlistees. The following entry
from Martin’s memoir illustrated that monetary assurances, as well as fraternity, influenced his
decision to fight for independence. “I thought, as I must go, I might as well endeavor to get as
much for my skin as I could; - accordingly, I told them that I would go for them.”60 Whether or
not men like Martin and Poheague believed that the war would threaten their economic security,
enlisted men believed that their service would play a profound role in the future relationship
between the American Colonies and Britain. However, Martin’s memoir indicated that many
soldiers never received the provisional rations promised to them by Continental commanders and
Congressional delegates. Despite their valor, a number of Connecticut Continentals suffered from
the skewed distribution of remunerations.
Continentals’ compensation records reveals the extent of the social and economic divisions
within the Connecticut Line. Poheague’s postmortem voucher was a shocking account of the
partiality of soldiers’ distorted payments. In addition, this unique voucher indicated that the social
and economic composition of the Connecticut Line was more diverse than previously understood.
While scholars have pointed out that the majority of the enlisted soldiers were from middling
backgrounds, Poheague’s advantageous property countered this argument.61 According to the
Committee of Payable’s 1783 payment, Poheague held a substantial amount of acreage that led to
the Committee of Payable’s decision to assign a prominent landowning agent from Stonington to
be the administrator for future transactions with Poheague’s property. Although Poheague served
60
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as a non-commissioned private, the Committee of Payable’s indication that he owned valuable
property in one of the most economically vibrant maritime towns in Connecticut during the lateeighteenth century suggests that the social and economic composition of the enlisted soldiers was
communally and financially diverse.
The Committee of Payable’s improper issuance of Poheague’s redeemable voucher is a
unique example of the existence of drastic compensation discrepancies among Connecticut
soldiers, and the fact that a soldiers’ social and economic status was an integral component of
service payment discrepancies.62 After examining Connecticut soldiers’ asset schedules,
compensation records, and officers’ orderly books, the Connecticut Line’s diverse social and
economic composition indicated that low-to-middle income soldiers’ remunerations were skewed
in comparison to soldiers from elite landowning families.63 As the American economy constricted
following the War for Independence, a number of poor farmers and mechanics, who served as
privates and officers, struggled to escape economic instability, malnutrition, and physical defects
caused by the war.
From the onset of the war, inequitable compensations were evident throughout the
Connecticut Line’s officer corps. After the Continental Congress authorized state legislatures to
raise a quota of infantry regiments for the establishment of the Continental Army, General
Washington was concerned about the election of men for the Continental officer corps. In a letter
to John Hancock in September 1776, Washington urged Hancock that in order to organize the
Continental Army “upon a permanent footing,” the Continental Congress must enlist men
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“actuated by Principles of honour, and a spirit of enterprize.”64 In other words, Washington implied
that the Continental officer corps should be comprised of wealthy landholding men. Yet how do
we explain the ascension of a working class farmer from New Hartford, Connecticut from a
Lieutenant to a Captain in less than a year, and the fact that he received a Continental Captain’s
commission?65
According to Aaron Austin’s 1820 affidavit presented to the Litchfield County Court for a
Federal service entitlement, Austin was appointed a Lieutenant in Colonel Hubael Griswold’s
regiment in “April or May 1775,” and served in the “Northern department” until December 1775.
Following his service in Griswold’s regiment, Austin indicated that he received a “Captains
commission signed by John Hancock,” and became a Captain within Colonel Charles Burrall’s
regiment on January 19, 1776. In addition, Austin noted that he “raised a company joined the
regiment marched into Canada and continued in the service until the fifth day of February 1777.”66
Austin’s ability to enroll troops indicated that soldiers from laboring backgrounds took advantage
of enrollment requirements to advance their rank-and-file in the Continental Army. Yet, while
Austin quickly ascended to a commissioned Captain within the Connecticut Line, his economic
livelihood following the war indicated a stark account of payment discrepancies within the state’s
quota of Continentals.67 On December 24, 1817, the House of Representatives passed a bill that
provided federal pensions of $8 per month for soldiers and $20 per month to officers who served
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in the Revolutionary War, and were incapable of earning an income.68 Although this federal
assistance was selective due to the sheer number of applicants, the seventy-two year old secured a
pension from the United States Government on April 1, 1818. At a rate of $20 per month, Austin
received a total of $102.66 from the Federal Pension Act of 1818. 69 Yet, on July 5, 1820 Austin
presented an affidavit to the Litchfield County Court for a more suitable remuneration for his
service. Evidently, the Federal Government’s payment for Austin’s service in the Revolutionary
War was not adequate, and it did not ameliorate his economic instability following the war.70
As a seventy-four year old farmer “able to do as much business as men in general of my
age,” Austin was indigent. Although he was a commissioned Captain, Austin’s livelihood was
affected by the recession of the late-eighteenth century.71 In addition to his disagreement over the
federal government’s pension, Austin indicated that the total value of his possessions added up to
$543, and included “forty acres of land,” “two cows,” “one old horse,” “two axes,” among other
meagre belongings. Austin’s static assets, and his inability to earn an income prevented him from
supporting his “feeble” wife, his “very poor” thirty-six year old daughter, and himself.
Furthermore, Austin noted that he required a “greater sum” for his service in the Connecticut Line,
and he required “the munificence of Government” to support him in his “old age and further saith
68
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rot.”72 Ultimately, he was trapped in a financially unstable position following his years as a Captain
for the Connecticut Line.
While some scholars suggest that the Continental officer corps were solely comprised of
elite landholding men, Austin’s social and economic standing countered this claim. Many
Connecticut soldiers were poor, or middling men, who momentarily quit their agrarian and
mechanical trades to serve in the War of Independence.73 A case study of Poheague’s and Austin’s
service and compensation records indicates that the Connecticut Line was socially and
economically heterogeneous. Evidently, poor farmers’ and urban mechanics’ economic
instabilities stemmed from payment inequities, and market forces in the late-eighteenth century.
According to Holton, while Connecticut legislators believed that debt relief legislation would
properly pay back private creditors for loaning money for the Continental Army’s supplies, these
ordinances triggered a shortage of specie in circulation. As a result, sawyers, farmers, and other
laborers became indebted to landowners, creditors, and tax collectors. The recession that followed
the war prevented a number of low-to-middle income veterans from being able to earn a steady
income to support themselves, and their families.74 Furthermore, while the Federal Pension Act of
1818 was a vanguard social policy program for the Federal Government of the United States,
administrators for the Office of the War Department poorly assessed its pension applicants on their
social and financial standings. After aggregating a population of captains, lieutenants, sergeants,
and privates in the Connecticut Line, the social and economic diversity of Connecticut’s enlisted
soldiers and officer corps was striking. Officers’ orderly books, soldiers’ pay roll records, letter
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correspondences between officers and Connecticut legislators, as well as soldiers’ pension records,
revealed that a soldier’s social and economic composition played an integral role in his
remunerations for service.
In order to properly set the stage for how a Revolutionary War soldier’s social and
economic standing figured into their remunerations, we must look back to the start of the war.
Following the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the Patriot force was composed entirely of militia
and state troops. According to historian D.J. Mulloy, Washington and the delegates of the
Continental Congress believed that a colony-funded army would be a more successful force against
British troops than decentralized militia units.75 However, throughout the Revolutionary War, the
Connecticut Militia remained an integral component of the American colonists’ force. Charles Hall
suggests that the Connecticut Militia averaged twenty-three thousand men throughout the war, and
was carved up into “twenty-eight regiments of infantry and five regiments of light horse.”76 In
addition to these volunteer regiments, in September and October 1776, Congress authorized the
enlistment of eighty-eight regiments to serve as the Continental Army, eight regiments being raised
in Connecticut. According to Charles Hall, 7,400 “from the [Connecticut] militia” became a part
of the “troops of the United Provinces of North America.”77 Over the course of two months, the
Continental Army formed into a centralized unit that would counteract British assaults on rural
communities and sustainable commercial hubs throughout the American colonies. In 1777,
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Alexander Purdie, a publisher from Williamsburg, Virginia, printed an ordinance authorized by
the Continental Congress that stated that the Continental soldiers and officers “shall be raised,
officered, clothed, armed, and equipped,” by each states’ legislatures “necessary for the defense
and welfare of the United States.”78 However, inequivalent medical attention, clothing rations, and
equipment quotas contradicted the delegates’ agenda for a “perpetual union between the states.”79
Connecticut officers’ orderly books, paymasters’ rationing account books, and surgeons’
journal entries reveal that a number of soldiers within the Connecticut Line did not receive
equivalent equipment rations, nor medical attention throughout the war. Noadiah Hooker, a
resident of Farmington, Connecticut, served as a Captain in General Joseph Spencer’s second
regiment from May 1, 1775 to December 18, 1775. As the descendant of Thomas Hooker, a
Congressionalist minister who founded Connecticut in the early-seventeenth century, Hooker
hailed from an elite Anglo-American family. While Hooker served as a Captain prior to the
organization of the Connecticut Line, his seven and a half month tenure as a military leader for
Connecticut enabled him to become a leader for the Connecticut Militia following his discharge.
In 1779, he was promoted to a Colonel in the Connecticut Militia’s fifteenth regiment.80 Hooker’s
orderly book consisted of a collection of military orders and disciplinary issues regarding the
Connecticut Militia’s fifteenth regiment, as well as a number of Connecticut Line regiments.
According to his entries throughout 1776, Hooker’s militia regiment was stationed at a
Ticonderoga encampment with a number of regiments from the Connecticut Line. Ultimately, his
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entries from October 1776 revealed low soldier morale and unsettling verdicts for court-martials
among the Continental soldiers.81 In order to maintain control of the regular standing army,
procedures, such as granting court-martials to disobedient soldiers, were common. However,
stringent martial protocols created numerous instances of soldiers deserting their posts.82
While a number of Hooker’s entries illustrated why some soldiers decided to disobey their
commanders’ orders and desert their companies, there were a number of instances of fraternity
among soldiers. For example, while stationed at an unspecified Ticonderoga headquarters, Hooker
recorded a cordial order authorized by Captain Asa Bray for his entire militia company on October
4, 1776. Due to the “wet weather,” Hooker noted that the company’s commanders issued “one gill
of rum to each noncommissioned officer and soldier in the company.”83 According to Hooker’s
entry in his orderly book, Bray felt the need to reward his militia unit for their determination to
stay in the fight, despite the apparent torrential rainfall. However, examples like Bray’s generosity
to fulfill his soldiers’ thirst for alcohol were rare. The hardships were evident from soldiers’
disciplinary punishments recorded by Hooker, especially for deserters.84
Hooker’s orderly book indicated that defiance and desertion was common among soldiers
who disagreed with officers’ imposing orders. Recalcitrance was rampant throughout the
Connecticut Line, as well as the Connecticut Militia.85 On October 6, 1776, Hooker recorded in
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his orderly book that a “general court martial of the lines” was to be held the following day for
“three lieutenants belonging to the independent company [of Captain Jonathan Johnson],” for
“deserting their posts without orders or being attacked by their enemies.”86 In addition to the three
unnamed lieutenants, Hooker’s entry also noted that the court-martial included an unspecified
number of “non-commissioned officers,” as well as an undefined number of “soldiers from three
[other] companies.”87 Although Hooker did not explicitly state which regiment the court-martial
pertained to, a cross-reference between the Connecticut Adjutant General’s office’s service record
and Hooker’s orderly record indicated that Hooker referred to a disciplinary issue in Colonel Philip
Burr Bradley’s Connecticut Line Battalion.88 Ultimately, Hooker’s record of a court-martial for
unidentified soldiers within Colonel Bradley’s Connecticut Line battalion signaled that a number
of soldiers evaded their commanding officers’ orders due to a potential dissatisfaction over the
rations set by their superiors, or discontent over their commanders’ directives.
The Connecticut Adjunct-General’s service record indicated that throughout the battalion’s
existence, seventeen men were appointed to lieutenant, and all served at one point or another.
While Hooker kept the court-martialed soldiers’ names anonymous, he most likely kept these
soldiers undisclosed in order to not interfere with the “Deputy Quartermaster General’s” decision
“to dismiss all who are negligent of their duty.”89 According to Hooker’s entry, the commanding
officers’ decision to drop disciplinary charges triggered the battalion’s superiors to place more of
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an emphasis on soldiers’ order completion and time away from their encampments. Hooker
described this decision by noting that the “commissary is to deliver to every noncommissioned
officer a soldier who are returned from guard every morning at nine o’clock,” and that the “officer
coming off guard [is] to sign the return of the commissary.”90 Ultimately, defiance triggered the
battalion’s leaders to adopt a more strict policy against soldiers disobeying orders. In effect, the
commanding officers’ draconian policy amplified the tension between the leaders of the
Connecticut Line’s fifth battalion and its soldiers.91
Hooker’s account of disobedience within the Connecticut Line’s battalion indicated that a
number of soldiers were dissatisfied with their commanding officers’ oppressive orders. 92 In
addition, inequivalent material rations were prevalent among the Connecticut Line, and created a
sense of discontent among many soldiers. The paymaster papers of Colonel Elisha Sheldon’s light
dragoons regiment illustrated an example of the rationing techniques used by the Connecticut Line.
According to the Connecticut Adjunct-General’s service record, Sheldon was appointed colonel
of the second regiment of light dragoons on December 12, 1776, and served throughout the war.
The Connecticut Adjunct-General’s service record noted that for most of the war, Sheldon’s light
dragoons served along the eastern side of the Hudson River in eastern New York and western
Connecticut.93 This geographically diverse regiment included men from towns in Hartford County,
as well as northern New Jersey, western Massachusetts, as well as a lieutenant from France. In
fact, Elijah Janes, the appointed paymaster for the regiment in 1782, was a resident of Brimfield,
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Massachusetts. Janes served as a cornet for the regiment in mid-November 1779, and a lieutenant
beginning in late-November 1779. After sustaining a ligament injury on the battlefield, Janes
became the regiment’s paymaster in 1782.94 Although this regiment was geographically diverse,
Janes’ paymaster papers showcased inequivalent material rationing among the regiment’s
privates.95
Janes’ clothing record for the light dragoon regiment indicated that all soldiers did not
receive the necessary equipment for battle. According to Janes’ “account of clothing [for the]
second regiment [of] light dragoons” from an unspecified year, the thirty-two recorded men
received the designated regiment’s coats, as well as one cloak each. However, all seven officers,
and six out of the twenty-three privates received a pair of boots. This begs the question as to why
less than thirty percent of the privates in this regiment received footwear.96 Evidently, this metric
contradicted the Continental Congress’s 1777 ordinance that all Continental soldiers and officers
“shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped.”97
Joseph Plumb Martin’s memoirs reveal that commanding officers’ issuance of inequivalent
clothing provisions, and soldiers’ dissatisfaction, was common throughout the Connecticut Line,
and created frustration and misery for a number of soldiers. In one instance Martin recounted that
he and his comrades “were forced by our old master, Necessity, to lay down and sleep if we could,
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with three others of our constant companions, Fatigue, Hunger, and Cold.”98 Martin’s account of
the unjust material rationing techniques used by a number of commanders for the Connecticut Line
depicted the miserable conditions many soldiers dealt with on a daily basis. In addition, Martin’s
illustration of the harsh weather conditions that a number of soldiers faced during the winter of
Valley Forge spoke volumes about the skewed material rations authorized by the Connecticut
Line’s commanding officers. During the winter of 1777, Martin noted that he and his fellow
soldiers were compelled to complete their orders despite having “little or no strength to perform it
with.”99 Martin’s accounts, and Janes’ 1782 clothing record for the second regiment of light
dragoons, showcased the extent of inequivalent material rations to a number of soldiers within the
Connecticut Line.
Hooker’s orderly book and Janes’ rationing accounts suggest that a number of soldiers’
inability to receive equal rations led to instances of despair and disobedience. In addition, the
Connecticut Line’s underlying social and economic diversity among the Connecticut infantry led
to inequivalent medical attention in the treatment of physical and mental impairments, as well as
bacterial syndromes. Dr. Albigence Waldo served as a surgeon for the Continental Army from
1775 to 1779. According to Joseph Hall’s 1883 compilation of the Waldo family’s town and
private records, Waldo, and his fellow licensed physicians, ventured from his hometown of
Pomfret, Connecticut to Boston “immediately after receiving news of the battle of Lexington, their
leader probably being General [Israel] Putnam.”100 From April 1775 to December 1776, Waldo
served as a physician in Cambridge and Roxbury “until honorably discharged, his health having
98
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failed him.”101 Following his recovery of an unspecified health circumstance, Waldo was
commissioned by Governor Trumbull “surgeon of the ship Cromwell” in December 1776.102
According to the Vice Admiralty Court of Halifax, Nova Scotia, the Oliver Cromwell was one of
the largest full-rigged ships constructed for the Connecticut naval force during the war, and
eventually was captured by the British Navy in July 1779.103 In April 1777, Waldo, “by the
Governor’s permission,” served as a surgeon for the first Connecticut Infantry Regiment until his
discharge in October 1779.104 Throughout his tenure as a physician for the Continental Army,
Waldo recorded notes on the services he performed during the war, as well as the inequivalent
medical services provided to low-ranking soldiers during and after the war.
According to a letter to the Connecticut State legislature circa 1785, Waldo pitied the
Connecticut soldiers’ “undeserved indigence,” and a number of soldiers’ “doleful prospect of rags
and starvation” during the late-1770s.105 Waldo’s letter indicated that the Connecticut Line’s social
and economic divisions hindered low-to-middle income soldiers from being able to receive
adequate medical attention above their commanders, who, in the majority of cases, were from elite
colonial families.106 According to the Waldo family’s genealogical records, Waldo’s unpublished
patient records contained approximately “6,000 patients treated by him,” and that “General
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Putnam’s name appears several times.”107 Furthermore, the Waldo family’s genealogical record
noted that Albigence “was a neighbor and intimate friend of the General,” given that “his brother
Samuel was the General’s son-in-law.”108 Nicknamed, “Old Put,” Israel Putnam hailed from an
Anglo-American family, and commanded the third regiment of the Connecticut Line during the
Battle of Bunker Hill, the Siege of Boston, as well as the Continental Army’s campaign in New
York during the late-1770s.109 Ultimately, the inability of commanding officers to provide
equivalent medical attention throughout the Connecticut Line led to a number of soldiers dying
from curable afflictions, and deserting their regiments.
According to one of Waldo’s diary entries from January 4, 1778, an indigenous soldier
within the Connecticut Line perished because of delayed medical attention. While stationed at
Valley Forge with the Connecticut Line’s first regiment, Waldo noted that he was “called to relieve
a Soldier thought to be dying – he expired before I reached the Hutt.”110 Waldo recounted in his
diary that the deceased “was an Indian – an excellent soldier – and an obedient good-natured
fellow,” and that “he fought for those very people who disinherited his forefathers.” 111 After
reflecting on the inequivalent medical attention throughout the Connecticut Line, Waldo noted
“what a frail-dying creature is Man.”112 Ultimately, Waldo’s depiction of a soldier who was unable
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to receive proper medical treatment suggests that commanding officers received more acute
medical attention than soldiers within the regular standing army.
Albigence Waldo’s letter to Connecticut legislators, his patient records, as well as his
depiction of the hopelessness a number of soldiers’ dealt with while on the battlefield, indicated
that many soldiers experienced emotional turmoil from their inability to receive adequate medical
attention. Why did a number of commanding officers for the Connecticut Line not place more of
an emphasis on universal medical treatment for soldiers who suffered from inequivalent clothing
rations or curable inflictions? After analyzing Waldo’s notes on his service during the
Revolutionary War, it is evident that a Connecticut soldier’s social and economic composition
played a significant role in whether or not he was able to receive medical attention, rudiment
rations, as well as financial security. At the onset of the war, poor farmers and urban mechanics
believed they held the advantage among the Continental Army’s commanders. Men from low-tomiddle income backgrounds were more likely to enlist if they received confirmation that they
would be compensated with “good and regular pay, annual clothing, and adequate food.”113
Charles Royster argues that the Continental Army’s constant desire for able-bodied men
throughout the war created a shortage for soldiers. In effect, middling, and poverty-stricken men
thought they held the upper hand in bartering for adequate clothing, nourishment, and pay.114
Joseph Plumb Martin recounted this perceived edge over commanders by noting, “I might as well
endeavor to get as much for my skin as I could.”115 Contrary to Martin’s eagerness to receive
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sufficient provisions for his service, a number of Connecticut Continentals received inequivalent
compensations and rations.
Albigence Waldo’s diary entries revealed that a number of Connecticut Line soldiers faced
financial hardships as a result of their commanders’ issuance of inequivalent provisions and
remunerations. On December 28, 1777, while stationed at Valley Forge, Waldo noted that “Six or
Seven [officers] of our Regiment” resigned from Colonel Jedediah Huntington’s infantry regiment
due to their “Families being so much neglected at home on account of Provisions.”116 Waldo’s
illustration of the resignation of these officers revealed that a number of commissioned officers
believed they were not justly compensated for their service. Furthermore, Waldo indicated that “it
is a melancholy reflection that what is of the most universal importance, is most universally
neglected – I mean keeping up the credit of money.”117 According to Waldo’s depiction, a number
of Connecticut Continentals believed that they were being financially deprived by their
commanders, as well as their state’s legislators.
Inadequate medical attention and material rations, as well as deficient remunerations,
occurred throughout the Connecticut Line.118 In a number of instances, these deficiencies
correlated with soldiers’ social and economic standing. In addition to the unjust provisional
rationing techniques used by commanding officers, many laboring soldiers remained vulnerable
against the inflationary market forces that laid ahead. Woody Holton suggests that the
Revolutionary War singlehandedly contributed to the economic recession of the late-eighteenth
century. Prior to the Treaty of Paris in 1783, state legislators were burdened with copious amounts
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of debt that had to be repaid to private creditors who supplied funds for the Continental Army.
Ultimately, the state governments’ debts triggered inflationary policies, such as the shortage of
specie, myopic debt relief legislation, as well as exorbitant taxes on poor farmers and urban
mechanics. In effect, a number of soldiers from the low-to-middle income sphere wrongfully
suffered with these debilitating shortcomings.119
119
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CHAPTER 2: MARKET FORCES AND THE RECESSION OF THE 1780s

On April 13, 1780, Governor Jonathan Trumbull called a meeting with the Connecticut
legislators to amend the Continental Congress’s “Act for the Establishment of Public Credit.” The
Connecticut General Assembly accepted the stark reality that “at a time when no regular civil
governments were established of sufficient energy,” the state governments struggled to properly
collect taxes and redeem bills of credit. Because of these barriers, the Connecticut General
Assembly agreed with Congress’s decision to “reduce the quantity of paper medium in circulation”
in order to “appropriate funds that shall ensure the punctual redemption of the bills.”120 Because
the amount of paper money declined, and specie remained scarce, the Connecticut legislative’s
order created debt deflation for ordinary Americans’ private arrears and taxes.121 Ultimately, the
Connecticut General Assembly, along with other state governments, believed a quota for paper
money would allow the Connecticut legislators to organize their payments, and, as a result, swiftly
pay back the private creditors’ bills of credit. For ordinary Americans, however, the shortage of
specie led to a stark decline in consumer purchasing power. As scholars have pointed out, the
economic recession of the 1780s was rooted in the state government’s disruptive economic policies
of debt-relief legislation, exorbitant taxes on low-to-middle income Americans, and the shortage
of currency. 122
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The Connecticut General Assembly’s indebtedness to private creditors, and the legislators’
short-sighted debt-relief legislation for creditors of the war, caused deflation following the war.
Throughout the War for Independence, private creditors provided the Continental Army with
supplies and funds. According to correspondence between Captain Roger Bulkley and Connecticut
merchants, loans allowed the Connecticut Line to function. As a leader in charge of supplying the
Continental Army with supplies in Colchester, Bulkley was heavily involved in livestock dealings
with David Trumbull, Jeremiah Wadsworth, among other private creditors in Connecticut. For
instance, on May 21, 1778, Wadsworth wrote to Bulkley confirming that he lent Bulkley “grey
horses by the barren.”123 Although Wadsworth did not specify the number of horses lent to
Bulkley, his business receipt indicated that the Connecticut Line’s commanders heavily relied on
private creditors’ dealings. Wadsworth was appointed by the Connecticut General Assembly, at
the onset of the war, to buy yarn stockings, kettles, pork, as well as procure over one thousand
pounds of specie for the Connecticut Line.124
Because of his experience as a dependable private creditor in supplying goods and funds
for the Connecticut Line, Wadsworth served as Commissary General of Purchases from April 1778
to December 1779. Bulkley’s 1778 correspondence with Wadsworth revealed that private creditors
could readily access supplies for the war effort through business and political connections. In
addition to Bulkley’s transaction with Wadsworth, David Trumbull, confirmed that he sold
Bulkley “sixty head of Continental oxen” on June 2, 1778.125 As the son of the Governor of
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Connecticut, Trumbull served as Assistant Commissary-General for the Connecticut General
Assembly during the war. According to his personal and business correspondences, Trumbull
handled supply transactions for the Connecticut Line.126 Ultimately, Bulkley’s transactions with
Trumbull and Wadsworth revealed that private creditors were an integral component of the dayto-day operations of the Connecticut Line.
Connecticut’s debt relief legislation during the late-eighteenth century, engineered by
Trumbull and the state’s legislators, sought to repay private creditors who supplied funds for the
Continental Army. In the process of doing so, Connecticut legislators’ decision to create a shortage
of currency orchestrated a deflationary economy as consumer purchasing power contracted, and
prices fell drastically. In conjunction with this strained monetary policy, the war brought on steep
taxation. Stephen Reed Grossbart argues that Connecticut’s regressive tax system placed an
unprecedented burden on a majority of the state’s population, specifically poor farmers and urban
mechanics. As I show in Figure 1, tax rates increased by approximately eightfold from the rates
levied prior to 1777 to those imposed during the early-1780s.127 The Connecticut legislators’ debtrelief legislation wrongfully miscounted for how shrinking the amount of paper money in
circulation would affect Connecticut’s working class.128 With a lack of sound economic decisionmaking, Connecticut’s debt-relief legislation materialized during the late-1770s. Legislators
focused on strategies to repay private creditors for their financial assistance to Connecticut’s
legislative body during the war. Holton argues that the majority of private creditors who supplied
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funds to the Revolutionary War effort dabbled in land speculation schemes or invested in risky
government securities. While a number of the Continental Army’s debtholders coincidentally
became delegates at the Constitutional Convention, Holton reveals that state legislators believed
they had an obligation to alleviate their debts with private creditors in order to revive the warridden American economy.129 The Connecticut General Assembly, like many of the other states’
legislative bodies, believed that compensating debtholders’ bills of credit was of grave importance
following the war. However, the legislators’ decision to create a shortage of circulating currency
prevented many middling and poverty-stricken Americans from earning a tenable income, and
burdened them with the war creditors’ debt.130
Figure 1: Tax Rates on Connecticut Citizenry Adjusted for Fiat Depreciation, 1774-1790

Figure 1: Data above takes into account the depreciation of paper money to translate all taxes into specie values (Grossbart, “The
Revolutionary Transition,” 1992, 180.)
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On January 2, 1778, the Connecticut General Assembly authorized the Continental Loan
Office’s “subscription papers,” that could not be “less than two hundred dollars,” to be bestowed
among sixty private creditors for their efforts to supply and fund the Connecticut Line. Among the
debtholders listed were Colonel Hezekiah Wyllys, Captain Aaron Bissell, and Deacon John
Whiting. According to the legislative order, the Connecticut General Assembly decided to
“procure Loan Office Certificates in favor of the lenders” in order to show proof of their debt to
the state. Furthermore, the Connecticut legislators determined that the sixty private creditors would
be “allowed by this State one quarter per cent” interest on their investments.131 While the 1778
order did not indicate a grand total for the state’s accounts payable for the private creditors, nor
did it outline whether or not this interest would grow over time, this resolution indicated that the
Connecticut General Assembly began mapping out repayment strategies for the state’s debtholders
during the Revolutionary War. The 1778 order also revealed that the Connecticut Line would not
have existed without loans from private creditors. For instance, if each of the sixty creditors
received a bill of credit entitling them to the minimum payment of two hundred dollars, the
Connecticut General Assembly owed approximately $12,000 for their debts.132 In part, the private
creditors’ decision to supply the Connecticut Line with supplies and funds was courageous due to
the fact that the Connecticut legislators did not confirm that they would fully repay the debtholders.
However, following the war, the Connecticut General Assembly’s debt-relief legislation
contributed to the economic recession of the 1780s, and the devastating financial shortcomings of
a number of low-to-middle income veterans.
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While private creditors supported the Connecticut General Assembly’s debt-relief
legislation in order to receive a sufficient return on their investments, poor veteran farmers, and
urban mechanics, remained vulnerable. According to a 1779 article from the Connecticut Courant,
many Americans were concerned with the Connecticut legislators’ debt. An anonymous author
going by the pseudonym, “Observator,” asserted that when the General Assembly “emitted those
bills, and pledged her faith for the redemption of them, she was in great distress.”133 Furthermore,
the author interpreted state governments’ debt with private creditors as a “bad bargain” because
poor farmers and urban mechanics would suffer from higher taxes. According to the anonymous
author, if state governments raised taxes in order to alleviate the states’ debts, “a middling farmer
from the eastern States, would not have more to pay than the avails of one yoke of fat oxen or fifty
bushels of wheat.”134 Ultimately, “Observator” argued that farmers struggled to pay such high
taxes, especially when Connecticut legislators diminished the money supply. To make matters
worse, economic output plummeted throughout the War of Independence. Warfare destroyed
individuals’ property, as well as the labor market’s productivity. As the strife took its toll on
individuals’ property, and led to many poor farmers and urban mechanics struggling to earn a
sustainable income, Connecticut’s economic production plunged, and a deflationary economy
began to coalesce.135
Low-to-middle income farmers and mechanics believed that the economic recession of the
1780s was rooted in the state government’s disruptive economic policies. Taxes, coupled with the
Observator, “Thoughts on the Paper Currency,” Connecticut Courant, March 9, 1779.
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shortage of paper money, contributed to the inflated state debts of poverty-stricken, and middling,
farmers and mechanics. As Holton reveals, by the end of the 1780s, the price of livestock fell by
roughly half, and land lost around two-thirds of its pre-inflationary worth.136 In addition to the
currency shortage and the regressive tax system, the issuance of promissory notes, otherwise
known as Consolidated notes, contributed to the economic slump following the war. State
governments issued these bonds to colonists who lent money to the states’ legislative bodies for
the war effort, as well as to army contractors and soldiers. Holton argues that every soldier in the
Continental Army received part of their compensation in these securities after the state
governments decided to shrink the supply of specie, beginning in the early-1780s. Unfortunately,
these bonds were essentially over-valued paper money, and worth only a fraction of their facevalue. While some soldiers held onto these undervalued bonds, a number of Americans sold them
out of disappointment, intuition, or absolute necessity.137 For example, Joseph Plumb Martin, a
Connecticut farmer who served throughout the war, indicated in his memoir how disappointed he
was that his compensation for years of valor were worthless bonds. According to Martin, a number
of men in his company, including himself, promptly sold these Consolidated notes “to procure
decent clothing and money sufficient to enable them to pass with decency through the country.”138
Martin and a number of his comrades realized that the market value of these promissory notes
were next to nothing, and believed selling the depreciated bonds would generate higher profits
than holding onto them.
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The short supply of specie contributed to more war bond holders speculating in the
unpredictable Consolidated note market. Ultimately, the Connecticut legislators’ decision to
continue to “reduce the quantity of the paper medium in circulation” in order to pay back private
creditors’ debts was counterintuitive. Leonard Richards estimates that approximately two percent
of Americans owned these bonds by 1790.139 One of the most significant examples of this excess
speculation in depreciated government paper money was the failed investment partnership between
General Nathanael Greene and Charles Pettit, a prominent Philadelphia merchant. According to
Holton, Greene collaborated with Pettit in an investment scheme purchasing $32,000 worth of
depreciated government securities, following his service as commander of the Southern theater
from the early-1780s to the end of the war. However, due to the investment’s lackluster return,
Greene struggled to hold onto the risky securities in the summer of 1784, and eventually sought
financial assistance from Jeremiah Wadsworth, the former Commissary General of Purchases for
the Connecticut General Assembly. Wadsworth refused involvement in this speculative
investment, and Greene allegedly committed suicide over the failed investment. According to a
letter written by Wadsworth to George Washington in early October 1786, Wadsworth
acknowledged that Greene’s death was prompted by his “troubles with the crediters of Banks &
Co,” and that “the General was left liable.”140 Wadsworth’s encounter with Greene’s speculative
investment revealed that the inflationary economy, coupled with the depreciated market value
nature of these government securities, was perilous on investors. Despite this, speculation
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remained rampant due to the short supply of currency. Further, Greene’s failed investment suggests
that the majority of war debt investments ended up in the hands of a small portion of affluent
Americans.141
As more and more speculators got their hands on these depreciated bonds, state
legislatures’ imposition of taxes created a dichotomy. While low-income Americans struggled to
pay taxes due to the short supply of specie in circulation, Consolidated note speculators benefitted
from state legislatures’ taxes, because they triggered interest payments for these investors. For
example, according to a January 1783 order, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted a “Tax of
One Shilling” on the “Polls and rateable Estate of the inhabitants of this State,” and confirmed that
all of the “Soldiers Notes” would “be received in payment of this tax.”142 The Connecticut
legislators’ order indicated that taxes improved the speculators’ return on investment through
interest payments. John Webb, a Connecticut speculator, observed that “our State Notes have
fallen to four shillings on the pound – oweing to the Assembly’s not laying any Tax of any kind
this session.”143 Furthermore, in a 1786 letter written to his brother, Samuel, Webb instructed his
brother to continue purchasing Consolidated notes because the tax increase in Connecticut, “may
enable me to turn them at 13/4 on the pound.”144 Webb’s correspondences with his brother revealed
that speculators understood that the market value of the Consolidated notes were positively
correlated to the state legislators’ securities tax. Yet the low-to-middle income veterans, who sold
141
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their consolidated notes, struggled to pay exorbitant taxes in light of the shortage of specie and the
inflationary economy.
Connecticut advocates against the state’s oppressive taxes, and debt-relief legislation,
blamed poor farmers and urban mechanics’ financial hardships on the state government’s policy
to tax the citizenry in order to procure interest payments for bondholders. According to a 1786
article from the Middlesex Gazette, an author who went by the pseudonym, “J” argued that “the
public securities are so many, that they never can be paid up by taxation or any other way.”145 The
anonymous author believed that the sheer number of Consolidated notes in circulation encouraged
speculation. In addition, “J” reasoned that these government securities were “no better on these
pieces of paper, then was on them bills.”146 The anonymous author believed that the war bond
initiative was a failure among state legislators and Congressional delegates, because poor farmers
and urban mechanics struggled to pay the interest-bearing taxes, and the notes did not solve
America’s massive debt problem.
A number of Connecticut residents believed that Governor Trumbull and the Connecticut
legislators were to blame for the excessive, and unjust, Consolidated note taxes on low-to-middle
income Americans. In addition, opponents of the state legislature’s oppressive monetary policies
sympathized with a number of poor veteran farmers and mechanics’ inability to pay off their
inflated personal, and interest taxes on the securities. In late March 1786, an anonymous author
wrote a letter to the printers of the Middlesex Gazette discussing his or her opinion on the
depreciation of the consolidated notes. The writer insisted that this recent economic event has
“J – ,” Middlesex Gazette, March 27, 1786, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.providence.idm.oclc.org
(accessed September 4, 2017).
145

146

Ibid.

53

“alarmed the country,” because securities were purchased by speculators from “worthy soldiers”
at a steep discount. Ultimately, the author argued that the speculators discounted investment
“undervalued the public credit.” Evidently, most speculators bought the soldiers’ notes “from one
shilling and six-pence to two shillings and six-pence on the pound,” whereas soldiers purchased
these securities at “two shillings on the pound.” Furthermore, the writer indicated that “the soldiers
that sold his notes at under par through necessity,” should seek legal reparations “against the buyer
for extortion.”147 This critique on the economically disruptive repercussions of securities
speculation indicated that a number of Connecticut residents were uneasy with low-to-middle
income veterans’ financial insecurities following the war, and revealed that speculative
investments only tainted the state’s debt.
A number of advocates against the state’s monetary policies believed that Connecticut’s
legislators should either intervene in the speculators’ investments by reimbursing noteholders at
market value rather than face value, or eliminate the issuance of the promissory notes.148 However,
Connecticut’s citizenry were bombarded with more taxes in an effort to drive down the state’s
domestic debt. For example, the Connecticut legislators instituted a 1783 tax order entitled, “Act
an Excise on All the Following Articles Sold by Retail or Consumed within the State.” According
to the tax agenda, a “Gallon of foreign Wine” was taxed one shilling, a “Gallon of West India
Rum” was taxed six pence, among other retail items. In addition, the legislature levied a tax of
“five Per Cent on the value thereof in lawful Money,” for civilians who purchased “Iron and Steel
Ware,” “wrought silks,” among other articles produced in the state.149 The Connecticut legislators’
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taxes on foreign imports, as well as domestic goods produced within the state, augmented the
burdens of a number of poor farmers and urban mechanics, such as the inability to earn an income,
or pay off their steep debts with creditors. However, some defenders of the Connecticut General
Assembly’s taxes believed that middling, and poverty-stricken citizens’ financial hardships were
rooted from their extravagant spending habits, coupled with idleness. For instance, Noah Webster
wrote an article in late September 1786 for the United States Chronicle under the pseudonym,
“Tom Thoughtful,” and argued that working class Americans struggled to pay their debts because,
“luxury rages among you, and luxury is the Devil.”150 Webster myopically argued that day
laborers’ monetary austerities were attributed to their excessive spending habits, rather than the
state legislature’s currency quota and its oppressive tax schedule. Some advocates in support of
the Connecticut legislature’s tight monetary policies believed that the Revolutionary War fueled
Continental soldiers’ desire to consume more than they could afford. For example, David Daggett,
an affluent attorney from New Haven, Connecticut, insisted that the war sparked instances of
“public opinion” that were “erroneous through general ignorance.”151 For Daggett, Webster, and
other advocates in support of the Connecticut General Assembly’s monetary policies, the excessive
spending of indebted civilians and impoverished veterans led to their inability to pay off justified
taxes.
While a number of prominent men from elite landholding families supported Connecticut’s
strict monetary policies, poor farmers and urban mechanics struggled to pay the state legislature’s
Safety from January 9, 1783 to November 15, 1783 Compiled in Accordance with an Act of the General Assembly,
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tariffs, as well as their private taxes, because the General Assembly had depleted the currency in
circulation. To exacerbate the state’s debt problem, as well as poor farmers and urban mechanics’
indigence, Congress authorized a new war bond. On September 27, 1785, the thirteen state
legislatures received a “requisition” from Congress that sought $3 million from taxpayers for
foreign debt to Dutch, French, and Spanish loan holders, as well as domestic debt for new officer
service bonds, Commutation certificates. Congress sought payment of “one year’s interest” for the
privileged officers who held these high market value bonds, and decided to “apportion to each
[state] a just quota of the public expenses.”152 The officer bonds came to fruition over some officers
threatening to commit mutinies among their respective citizenry, neglecting to defend civilians
from future attacks by marching across the Appalachian Mountains, and even hinting that the state
legislatures faced the possibility of a military coup.153 Ultimately, Congress reluctantly agreed with
their demands and authorized officer pensions, which were virtually bonuses worth five years’
service.154 According to a resolution passed on May 27, 1778, Congress authorized that the
“Monthly pay of the officers and soldiers” was to be based on the “rank in the line of the army.”155
For example, commissioned Colonels received seventy-five dollars per month, commissioned
Majors received fifty dollars per month, and commissioned Captains received forty dollars per
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month. Furthermore, the delegates indicated that these rates of payment “formed the basis of the
settlements with the officers for their Commutation of five years’ full pay.”156 Congress authorized
another speculative debt instrument with an over-valued face value. As with the Consolidated
notes, these bonds ended up in the hands of elite landholding Revolutionary war officers, as well
as in the hands of investors who did not serve. Poor farmers and urban mechanics, continued to
struggle to pay the Connecticut legislature’s cumbersome poll and property taxes, as well as the
additional payment for Commutation certificates.157
In an effort to raise interest payments for the officers’ payments, Congress’s 1785
requisition increased the Connecticut citizenry’s tax burden. According to a tax account conducted
by the Connecticut legislators in October of 1785, each Connecticut town was forced to pay “£39
8 9 on the six penny Tax on the List 1783,” as well as the sum of “£8 10 3” for the 1784 tax list.158
A number of low-to-middle income Americans believed their debts derived from speculators on
these securities. One anti-Commutation activist believed that the Connecticut legislators’ only
option to save working class Americans from “perpetual taxes” was to reduce the “heavy state debt
lay upon us for depreciation to officers.”159 According to the anonymous author with the
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pseudonym, “Agricola,” it would be “impolitic and injurious” if Connecticut’s legislators allowed
its citizenry to pay interest on officers’ bonds.160 Low-to-middle income workers understood that
their taxes would drastically increase with the new interest tax for the procurement of
Commutation bonds.
As uproar intensified over the state’s regressive tax system, a number of Continental
officers publicly disapproved of Congress’s requisition. For example, a Connecticut Courant
article from May 28, 1787 recorded Charles Burrall and Benjamin Chaplain’s speeches in front of
the Connecticut House of Representatives on May 15, 1787. Burrall believed that the “people
ought not to be taxed beyond their abilities.”161 Chaplain insisted that a number of poor farmers
and mechanics from Windham County, Connecticut were “distressed” over the collection of more
taxes. Furthermore, Chaplain indicated that a number of farmers already felt the need to “sell off
their flock, their oxen, and their cows.”162 Because of the social uproar over Commutation
certificates, the Connecticut House of Representatives dismissed Congress’s requisition in October
of 1786 on the grounds that Connecticut’s citizenry were “labouring under Embarrasements by
reason of Arreages of former taxes.”163 Governor Trumbull and the Connecticut legislators could
not bear to tack on an addition tax to the people. According to Jensen, because liquidity was scare,
Agricola [William Williams], “To the Inhabitants of Connecticut,” Connecticut Courant, October 9,
1786. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.providence.idm.oclc.org (accessed September 5, 2017).
160

“Charles Burrall, Benjamin Chaplain, Speeches in Connecticut House of Representatives, May 15,
1787,” Connecticut Courant, May 28, 1787. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.providence.idm.oclc.org (accessed
September 5, 2017).
161

162

Ibid.

“Whereas the Requisitions of Congress and Other Communications have been Received and Laid
Before the Assembly, October 12, 1786,” in The Public Records of the State of Connecticut from May, 1785,
through January, 1789 Compiled in Accordance with an Act of the General Assembly, ed. Leonard Woods Labaree,
(Hartford: State of Connecticut), 1945, 232.
163

58

Commutation certificates continued to be distributed throughout the states. Yet, while the security
payments were supposed to draw six percent interest for holders, the Confederation Government
lacked the funds to redeem them.164 In effect, a number of Continental officers sold their
Commutation certificates in the securities market, and received returns as low as twelve and a half
cents on the dollar. By the time Congress ratified legislation that sought to redeem these certificates
on August 4, 1790, speculators possessed the majority of these securities, and many officers
forfeited their promised returns.165
The Connecticut state legislature’s noncompliance with Congress’s 1785 requisition
eventually led to many officers not receiving their distinguished compensations. While it is
peculiar that Congress’s bold Commutation strategy faded away, public uproar in Connecticut
played a major role in the security initiative’s demise. In a letter from Samuel Adams to Noah
Webster, Adams concluded that the officer corps payment initiative failed because it was “too
much altercated.”166 In addition to Adams’s deduction, Charles Royster indicates that a number of
civilians “wanted the officers, like the privates, to return to civilian life inconspicuously,” and
renounce “invidious claims to have done more, for independence than civilians had done.” 167 By
the end of 1785, support for Congress’s requisition waned as a result of a number of Connecticut
residents who opposed yet another governmental scheme that hindered ordinary Americans’
financial stability, and created unrestrained speculation.
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Although Congress’s requisition eventually collapsed, the Connecticut legislators failed to
understand that heavy tax and debt collection hindered poor farmers and urban mechanics ability
to work. According to Holton, pro-creditor debt-relief legislations further diminished available
capital, as well as labor productivity.168 A number of essayists understood this matter, and sought
to educate Connecticut’s citizenry about why the low-to-middle income Americans, a majority of
whom served as Continentals, were caught in a financial pitfall. An anonymous author who went
by the pseudonym, “A Citizen of Connecticut,” wrote an essay in an April 1786 issue of the
Connecticut Courant that identified that farmers and mechanics suffered more than any other
socioeconomic group. While “A Citizen of Connecticut,” believed that the “idle and prostrate,”
were affected by the recession, the author believed that the “industrious laborious farmer,” was far
more affected by the currency shortage. The author went so far as to reveal that farmers he was
acquainted with “lost their estates” and persistently struggled to “extricate themselves out of their
troubles.” Ultimately, this author indicated the discouraged mentality a number of middling, and
poverty-stricken, farmers and urban mechanics held following the war.
Newspaper articles revealed that many Connecticut citizens were agitated with the state
legislature’s inability either to loosen their strict monetary policies, or combat rampant speculation.
The state legislature’s poor economic decision making even led to instances of attempted revolt.
According to the Middlesex Gazette, in November 1786, a group of farmers and artisans in Preston,
Connecticut were accused by state legislators for conspiring to support Daniel Shays’ insurgency
in Massachusetts.169 “Zeno,” the author’s alias, believed that the Connecticut legislators’ inability
168
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to recognize that low-to-middle income Connecticut civilians could not bear the inflationary
economy any longer, and that “this most horrid distemper” had the potential to “become
universal.” Securities speculation and shortsighted debt-relief legislation destroyed labor
productivity among middling and poverty-stricken citizens. Furthermore, the economic failure of
the war bond initiatives, and the currency shortage, worsened the financial stability for many
impoverished veterans, specifically poor farmers and urban mechanics. Regardless of whether or
not officers or soldiers were commissioned during their service, many veterans from the low-tomiddle income socioeconomic sphere became increasingly indigent from the inflationary
economic downturn.

CHAPTER 3: THE ALTERED ‘DEBTS OF HONOUR’

Many low-to-middle income veterans, specifically poor farmers and mechanics, suffered
from unequal and inadequate provisions during the war, and then faced the hardships of
deflationary market forces beginning in the mid-1780s. Yet while many disenfranchised
Connecticut veterans could not overcome their financial setbacks, entitlements for many
physically wounded Revolutionary War veterans coalesced beginning in the late-1780s. The first
instances of military pensions and land benefits stemmed from the ratification of the Bill of Rights
in the early 1790s. While appealing to state and federal lawmakers became a codified right through
the First Amendment, the practice of petitioning had been an enduring custom through Anglo legal
precedent. Through this process, individuals could address their economic, political, and social
concerns to legislators in order to refine, or create, statutes that ameliorated their grievances.170
Specifically, the First Amendment documented Americans’ right to petition the United States
Congress for aid to mend individuals’ debt, trade disputes, poverty, and property damage. In the
midst of state building, the ratification of the Bill of Rights allowed Americans to play a greater
role in the legislative process by retaining the affirmative right to state their injustices toward
legislators, and having the expectation that policymakers were to be receptive to citizens’
resentments. In effect, petitioning led to Congress’s commitment to provide entitlements to
disabled military veterans.171
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As the First Congress of the United States preserved its control over assessing personal
monetary claims, such as financial assistance appeals for poverty, injuries, and debt relief,
entitlements for disabled veterans were of utmost importance for Congress’s social policy agenda.
Pensions for disabled veterans struck a nerve with Congress, as it had with the Confederation
Congress, because, in the majority of instances, physically impaired veterans were unable to work,
nor able to attain an adequate standard of living.172 Congressional support for disabled veterans’
entitlements remained strong throughout the early-nineteenth century. Seth Weed, a Lieutenant
within Colonel Charles Webbs’ Connecticut Line regiment, benefitted from Congress’s
preservation of pensions for disabled veterans. According to a letter written by Weed to the Office
of War Department on January 25, 1819, he was shot by a “musket ball” in his left leg following
the British Army’s raid on Danbury, Connecticut, during the spring of 1777. Although Weed did
not indicate when he began receiving payments from the Office of War Department, nor the total
amount of his entitlement, he revealed that he obtained a payment of $81.60 per year.173 According
to an 1818 follow-up medical correspondence recorded by Sam Webb and John Auger, two
surgeons appointed by Pierpont Edwards to assess Weed’s medical state, his wound had turned
into an infective ulcer. The surgeons noted that Weed was “incapable of procuring” a steady
income through “manual or bodily labor.”174 Weed was eventually compensated with a large
172
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payment of $431.75 on June 25, 1818 for his physical impairments, because Congress decided to
appropriate more money for the national-level entitlement in 1816.175 On March 8, 1816, Congress
used a portion of the United States Treasury’s surplus to increase the disabled veterans’ rates
“according to their ranks and degrees of disabilities.”176 Evidently, the Fourteenth Congress
continued to provide disabled veterans with comfortable remunerations for their physical
impairments sustained during the war. Despite Weed’s inability to receive suitable medical
attention following his injury, he was compensated with an entitlement, because Congress
supported pensions for disabled veterans.
While disabled veterans received remunerations from the Federal Government beginning
in the late-1780s, service-based pensions remained contentious among legislators since the end of
the Revolutionary War. Advocates who supported a universal service allotment believed that all
veterans who could not earn an income to support themselves deserved cash benefits in recognition
of their service. However, this concept failed to warrant support among Congress because of the
long-standing rejection by martial leaders of the Revolutionary War, as well as the American
public. While the Continental Army dealt with desertions during the winter of 1778, primarily
because of the Continental Army’s inability to provide soldiers with either adequate monthly pay
or provisions, Washington dismissed service pensions as a feasible option to bolstering soldiers’
morale. In November 1777, Washington noted in his personal writings that universal service-based
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pensions would “give great disgust to the people at large.”177 Washington’s rationale was twofold.
He believed that service-based pensions were an unnecessary expense that would undoubtedly
drive up the national debt, and he also believed that service-based pensions would create an
unwarranted clash among different ranked soldiers, and Americans who did not serve in the statefunded infantry regiments. For Washington, he believed that many citizens could become alienated
over an entitlement statute that determined which Americans should receive a greater distinction
for their martial contributions.178 In terms of the states’ growing debt, Washington argued that
service entitlements to all soldiers would yield an “enormous expense” that would “add such
weight to a debt already.”179
Despite Washington’s perspective, the onset of Commutation certificates set off a series of
dissensions between the public and the soldiers over social and economic standing. As officers
demanded pension payments for their service, debate over the justness of the Commutation notes
brought about clashes between socioeconomic classes. While Continental officers demanded
entitlements from the Federal Government because they claimed their financial insecurities
stemmed from the war, these contentions only heightened the unjust notion that remunerations
depended on soldiers’ rank, as well as their social and economic status. Furthermore, the discord
over the Commutation notes worsened impoverished soldiers’ ability to receive pensions, because
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veterans’ social distinctions had become an integral component in determining who could receive
remunerations for service.180
When President James Monroe took office in 1817, however, Congress devised a robust
social program act that looked to compensate indigent Revolutionary War veterans with monthly
pension payments. For a number of low-to-middle income veterans, hope was restored. According
to Jensen, because Monroe served as a Revolutionary officer, he encouraged Congress to construct
a service pension proposal that would ameliorate financial instabilities for all surviving officers
and soldiers.181 Monroe clarified that since the ratification of the United States Constitution in
1789, the democratic republic had created “profitable commerce,” and “an extraordinary
elevation” in public credit. However, in the wake of settling a significant amount of the United
States’ outstanding public debts, Monroe addressed the sad truth that surviving Revolutionary
veterans “were reduced to indigence, and even to real distress.”182 Although Monroe believed “that
the number to be benefitted by any provision” would not be large because the war ended more than
three decades ago, he believed service payments to surviving veterans would “do honor to their
country to provide for them.”183 After months of legislative jockeying among supporters and
opponents of Monroe’s universal service pension program, a compromised version became law on
March 18, 1818.184 According to the new entitlement law, men who served in the Continental
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Army or Navy for at least nine months were entitled to receive pensions if they could demonstrate
their “reduced circumstances in life.”185 Unlike Monroe’s vision, the law gave the Office of War
Department’s administrators the authority to accept or dismiss an applicant’s declaration for a
pension. Due to these procedural guidelines, a number of administrators selectively assessed
applicants’ financial worth and the extent of their poverty.
While Monroe hoped that the Federal Government could bestow pensions to all aged and
poverty-stricken veterans, the Pension Act of 1818’s guidelines exposed social and economic
disparity in the Continental Army. The Office of War Department’s inequitable remunerations
greatly affected poor farmers and urban mechanics who served in the Connecticut Line. Although
Jensen indicates that the Pension Act of 1818 was a watershed moment for domestic social
policymaking, she argues that the entitlement program’s rigid eligibility structure encouraged selfinterest and elitism to play a dominant role in applicants’ assessments.186 One of the most
significant problems with the Office of War Department’s pension assessment process was that it
lacked an objective analysis of an applicant’s financial state. Ultimately, the Office of War
Department’s administrators verified whether or not a petitioner legitimately served for more than
nine months and determined the total amount to be paid to the petitioner based on their recorded
income disparity, and infirmities. In addition, administrators for the Office of War Department did
not evaluate applicants on an impartial case-by-case basis. Instead of carefully assessing a
petitioner’s income disparity in relation to their demographic standing, the administrators
evaluated its applicants on their written declarations that included the value of their possessions,
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as well as why they required an entitlement from the Federal Government. Secretary of War John
Calhoun, who oversaw the entitlement program, admitted to Joseph Bloomfield, the Chairman of
the Committee on Revolutionary Pensions for Congress, that the pension assessors had made a
number of “impositions or mistakes” in payment amounts due to the growing number of applicants.
Despite the program’s “strict construction,” Calhoun revealed that the entitlement act had “been
less successfully executed” in improving beneficiaries’ “condition in life, as to property.”187
Furthermore, according to unrevealed sources, Calhoun disclosed that “many of the pensioners”
hailed from “more affluent circumstances than that which the act contemplated.”188 By not
assessing veterans’ financial insecurities on a case-by-case basis, assessors bestowed inequitable
payments to a number of pension applicants.
Reports trickling out of the Office of War Department that some petitioners fared better
than others who were thought to be more deserving shocked Connecticut residents. For example,
on July 16, 1818, the Middlesex Gazette published a letter written by Henry Shaw that chastised
the pension assessors’ inability to objectively examine veterans’ dire need of assistance. The
Congressman from Berkshire, Massachusetts believed that this issue was a “severe injustice”
toward the “venerable, but indigent Soldier.”189 In the same issue of the Middlesex Gazette, the
town’s clerk published the proceedings from the Middletown town meeting on December 6, 1819.
A number of Middletown residents criticized veterans of “affluent circumstances” distastefully
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seeking entitlements from the Federal Government. Elisha Coe, the moderator at the town meeting,
encouraged the Middletown citizenry to report any information of this fraudulent activity to the
town’s political leaders. Although Calhoun had made it clear that he would eradicate all
entitlements made to more well off pensioners by re-assessing beneficiaries’ degree of financial
instability, a number of Connecticut veterans suffered from the administrators’ payment
discrepancies.190
The fragmented nature of the entitlement program encouraged administrators to make
payment decisions based on preferences.191 For example, on April 17, 1818, the Office of War
Department began to remunerate Elias Stevens, a Connecticut veteran from Killingworth who
served as a private for three years in a regiment commanded by Colonel Heman Swift. According
to Stevens’ file, he received a pension payment for four consecutive months that totaled $36.80,
until the Office of War Department asked him to testify before a local district judge in order to
continue to receive the Federal Government’s entitlement.192 However, on June 14, 1820, Stevens
gave his declaration of need to the Middlesex County Court’s Clerk, and presented an upscale
asset schedule that totaled $705.50 (see Table 1). According to his testimony, Stevens insisted that
“lameness and rheumatism” prevented him from blacksmithing, a trade that he had performed for
more than thirty years. However, his assets revealed that Stevens owned one “house barn,” and
“two-thirds of an old house and barn” situated on close to seventy-three acres of land. In addition
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to these possessions, Stevens owned more than twenty animals, including horses, oxen, and sheep,
as well as furnished items such as a “Bureau” and a “Bookcase.”193 After the Middlesex County
Court examined Stevens’ testimony and asset schedule, Stevens received a letter from the Office
of War Department on July 8, 1820 informing him that “on account of the amount of your
property,” his name was “stricken from the Pension List.”194 Stevens’ ability to receive a pension
from the Office of War Department, given the extent of his possessions, indicated that the Pension
Act of 1818 created inequitable remunerations among the applicant pool.
The significance of Stevens’ payment undermined the original purpose of the service
pension program. Rather than relieving impoverished veterans’ financial instabilities, the Office
of War Department’s payments to Stevens reveals social and economic divisions that existed in
the Connecticut Line, as well as the preferential nature of the service entitlement program. On July
4, 1820, George Batterson, a sixty-three year old veteran from Warren, Connecticut filed an
affidavit with the Litchfield County Court. According to Batterson’s declaration, he also served in
the regiment commanded by Colonel Heman Swift for three years beginning in 1781. Batterson
informed Frederick Wolcott, the court’s clerk, that he was a blacksmith by trade, but “unable to
work at his trade for several years” due to a “Rheumatic Affection.” Batterson later admitted in
his declaration that he had “no hope of being able to work [as a blacksmith] again.”195 A valuation
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of his possessions of “one house on [the] highway,” “one cow,” among other basic household
items brought the total value of his possessions to $57.85. Clearly, the Office of War Department’s
entitlement to Batterson of $35.78 on April 21, 1818 was of little assistance (see Table 1).
Batterson’s financial situation indicated the poverty trap a number of working class Connecticut
veterans experienced following the war. In addition, a comparison between Batterson’s financial
difficulties and Stevens’ means revealed an example of the Office of War Department’s inequitable
payments to Revolutionary War veterans.196
Although Batterson and Stevens both served for three years as non-commissioned privates,
Stevens received a greater entitlement payment than Batterson. If the total value of Stevens’ assets
were $647.65 greater than Battersons’ assets, why was he compensated more than Batterson (see
Table 1)? The Office of War Department’s miscalculations led to this payment discrepancy. The
pension program’s improper assessment strategies enabled the assessors to make errors due to the
overwhelming number of applicants.197 In Connecticut alone, the Office of War Department
compensated 1,373 veterans between 1818 and 1820. Approximately 8,398 pension recipients
resided in New England. These statistics revealed that the sheer number of applicants created a
sizable room for error in determining payment amounts.198 Furthermore, the financial contrast
between the two men indicated that the pension assessors incorporated the social and economic
standing of Batterson, and Stevens in their payment decision.
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Despite striking differences in soldiers’ value of assets, pension assessors placed a far
greater emphasis on social and economic standing, rather than proven indigence, in their
remunerations to veterans. Pension payments among working class Connecticut veterans, as
displayed in Table 1, were skewed. This division was particularly true for applicants that indicated
they were “day laborers,” by occupation. An aggregation of thirty-four Connecticut veterans’
pension records, filed throughout the state, illustrates the extent of the social and economic
divisions among Connecticut’s surviving veterans from 1818 to 1820. On March 10, 1819, Edward
Fuller, a resident of Norfolk, began receiving a monthly entitlement of $8. In total, he would
receive $46.70 from the Office of War Department.199 As a private who served for one year in a
regiment commanded by Colonel Charles Burrel, Fuller’s financial instability following the war
was at the lowest-tier of the aggregation (see Table 1). According to an affidavit presented to the
Litchfield County Court on July 5, 1820, Fuller testified in front of the Honorable Frederick
Wolcott that the entitlement package he received from the Federal Government was insufficient in
relieving his destitution. “I have no property [whatsoever],” stated Fuller. While neither Wolcott
nor Fuller provided an explanation for his poverty, private debts and the state’s exorbitant taxes
most likely contributed to his “total amount in value of property” of zero dollars.200
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Table 1: Payments to Connecticut Veteran Applicants following the Pension Act of 1818
Occupation

Blacksmith

Number of % of Pension Number of Years Total
Applicants Applicants
in Service
Payment
Range ($)
2
6.25
3.00
35.78 - 36.80

57.85 - 705.50

Day Laborer 7

21.88

0.75 - 6.00

37.60 - 137.54 0 - 282.48

Sawyer

2

6.25

0.75 - 1.00

88.80 - 121.30 87.95 - 159.85

Farmer

11

34.38

0.85 - 6.00

35.73 - 184.53 0 - 281.30

Shoemaker

3

9.38

1.00 - 6.00

37.33 - 138.58 76.25 - 382.07

Laborer

3

9.38

3.00 - 6.00

37.60 - 135.69 0 - 68.77

12.50

0.75 - 6.00

67.00 - 216.00 14.00 - 65.50

Occupations 4
of one
a

Total Value of
Assets ($)

Occupations of one: carpenter, merchant, seaman, tailor

Fuller’s affidavit revealed that his age, and potential physical impediments, led to his
inability to earn an income as a day laborer and to be self-sufficient. While the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics did not accurately track unemployment rates prior to 1890, census data
reveals the extent of the labor productivity pitfall in 1820. While the population of Connecticut in
1820 was approximately 275,000, ninety-two percent of the state’s population resided in rural
Connecticut, while 21,000 individuals resided in cities, towns, and villages.201 In 1820,
approximately 17% of the Connecticut population was made up of residents aged forty-five years
and older. Although the census did not have accurate projections to determine the number of
workers able to earn an income, the report indicated that one percent of the state’s population was
a part of the labor force in 1820.202 While statistical inaccuracies need to be taken into
consideration, the data reveals how the labor market shortage contributed to the impoverishment
201
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of many Connecticut veterans. On April 22, 1818, Henry Baldwin, a resident of Cornwall, started
to receive a monthly payment of $8, which would amount to $83.47. Baldwin served for nine
months in a company commanded by Captain Edward Shipman.203 On July 4, 1820, Baldwin, a
sixty-eight- year-old ex-soldier for the Connecticut Line, appeared before the Litchfield County
Court’s administrators to present a declaration toward the entitlement he received from the Office
of War Department, as well as a schedule of his assets valued at $93.68 (see Table 1).204
With passage of the Federal Pension Act of 1818, the Office of War Department required
all local county court administrators to assess the value of the applicants’ possessions. A valuation
of an applicant’s assets revealed more about their finances, labor productivity, and social status in
the wake of the recession of the 1780s than a single paragraph that outlined their declaration for
financial support. After revealing that he worked as a day laborer “but a small part of the time,”
Baldwin confessed that he could not perform steady labor on account of his health. In addition, the
fact that his sixty-one-year-old wife could only perform “very light work,” indicated that Baldwin
and his wife were not able to work sustainably, nor earn incomes. Yet, Baldwin’s asset schedule
revealed the extent of his financial instability. Baldwin’s possessions included two cows, one calf,
three young cattle, a wagon and harness for a horse, among other agricultural assets.205 The issue
with Baldwin’s financial state was twofold. First, the schedule did not indicate that he owned any
land. Second, the majority of Baldwin’s assets were static in that he was not able to grow the value
“Pension File of Henry Baldwin, April 22, 1818,” Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land
Warrant Application Files, (NARA microfilm publication M804, 2,670 rolls), Records of the Department of
Veterans Affairs, Record Group 15, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (accessed www.ancestry.com on August
31, 2017).
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of furniture or agricultural tools without costs of repair. Yet, at the end of his valuation, Baldwin
stated that he was “indebted and owe[d] eighty dollars.” While Baldwin did not explicitly reveal
the source of his indebtedness in the affidavit, the number of household assets suggests that
Baldwin rented property and became indebted to a Cornwall landowner. Regardless of what
actually caused his arrears, the fact that Baldwin’s debt was $3.47 lower than the payment he
received from the Office of the War Department brings to question how the department’s
administrators arrived at the total entitlement payments to selected applicants.206 Ultimately, the
Office of War Department did not have a standard algorithm that determined which applicant
received how much in remunerations from the Federal Government. Rather, entitlement packages
were determined at the discretion of administrators’ selection.207
Baldwin and his wife’s inability to work caused their financial despondence. However, a
comparison between Baldwin and Edward Fuller reveals another example of the perplexing
discrepancies in Connecticut veterans’ pension payments. Baldwin’s asset schedule revealed that
he did not have the financial means of Elisa Stevens. However, in terms of asset schedule
valuation, Fuller was far more impoverished than Baldwin. Despite Fuller’s total asset value of
zero dollars, Baldwin received an entitlement that was $36.77 more than Fuller’s total payment of
$46.70 (see Table 1). Ultimately, a comparison between these two men unveils pension assessors’
inability to evaluate the claimants’ needs, as well as the assessors’ impartial remunerations based
on applicants’ social and economic standings. Fuller served as a Continental private for three more
months than Baldwin’s nine month service tenure. While Congress’s service legislation intended
“Henry Baldwin Affidavit to Superior County Court of Litchfield, July 4, 1820,” Litchfield County
Pension Records, 1820 – 1834, Litchfield Historical Society.
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to entitle veterans who served for a minimum of nine months “in need of assistance from his
country for support,” the payment discrepancy between Baldwin and Fuller was clear. 208 This
deviation in aid brought out the social and economic contrast of the state’s Continental Army, as
well as the extent of the wealth gap among patriot beneficiaries.
The entitlements were not determined by years of service, extent of poverty, physical or
health impediments, among other quantitative variables. Rather, discrepancies in pay emerged
from the War Department administrators’ counterintuitive assessment strategies. Whether or not
the differences in payments arose from mere error, the imbalance of payments brought out
Connecticut veterans’ social and economic disparities. Pension records for surviving veterans
reinforced the extent of the Connecticut Line’s stark wealth gap. An aggregation of twenty-seven
Connecticut privates revealed extensive payment discrepancies. Among the population of privates,
remunerations were irregular in that the payments did not correlate with financial instability and
service tenure (see Table 2). For instance, Gideon Goff, a day laborer from Wethersfield, received
$37.60. According to his April 1818 affidavit, Goff served six years in a company commanded by
Captain Edward Buckley until he was “honorably discharged at West Point” on June 9, 1783. 209
Despite his honorable service tenure, an assessment of Goff’s asset schedule on August 1, 1820
revealed that the total value of the fifty-nine year old’s possessions stood at $282.48, and included
a “dwelling House and Barn” valued at $200. While Goff’s asset schedule, which included
“An Act to Provide for Certain Persons Engaged in the Land and Naval Service of the United States in
the Revolutionary War, March 18, 1818,” in The Pension Laws of the United States, ed. Mayo, 107-108.
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livestock and various household items, did not suggest that he was affluent, the amount he received
in entitlements is puzzling when stacked up against his fellow Connecticut applicants.210
Table 2: Payments to Privates in the Connecticut Line following the Pension Act of 1818
Number of % of Pension Number
Applicants Applicants
of Years
in Service
10
37.04
0 - 1.99

Total
Total Value of Assets ($)
Payment
Range ($)
35.73 - 184.53 0 - 159.85

11

40.74

2 - 3.99

35.78 - 137.55 0 - 705.50

6

22.22

4-6

37.60 - 137.54 13.24 - 282.48

Length of service did not entitle a surviving veteran to greater financial aid. Congress’s
Pension Act of 1818 did not state that any variable applied to the amount of veterans’ entitlements
besides being in “reduced circumstances in life.”211 Goff received the same payment as a
Wethersfield laborer whose asset schedule amounted to zero dollars. Justus Blinn served for three
years in the same company as Goff, and received the same amount as Goff from the Office of War
Department in April of 1818.212 Yet, according to an affidavit recorded by the Hartford County
Court on August 1, 1820, Blinn was indigent. At seventy-three years old, the Hartford County
Court administrators valued Blinn’s asset schedule at zero dollars (see Table 2). Blinn revealed
that he was unable to work on account of his health, he had “no property except necessary beddings
210
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www.ancestry.com on August 31, 2017).
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and clothing,” and that he had “no dependence for support except charity.”213 In light of Blinn’s
oath, as well as his idle asset schedule, the Federal Government rewarded Goff the same amount
as Blinn. Rather than objectively examining both applicants, the Office of War Department’s
assessment procedure did not justly recompense a number of veterans.
Pension payments were skewed among surviving privates of the Connecticut Line.
Beneficiaries’ affidavits and asset valuations showcased the Office of War Departments’ partial
assessment strategies in bestowing just remunerations to veterans in financial despair. In addition
to Connecticut privates, an aggregation of seven surviving officers revealed less drastic, yet
notable payment inequities. For instance, John Bulkeley, a mariner from Lyme, received a total
entitlement of $98.00.214 According to an affidavit recorded by the New London County Court on
June 27, 1820, Bulkeley served for five years as a lieutenant in a regiment commanded by Colonel
Andrew Ward. Despite his service in the Connecticut Line’s officer corps, an assessment of
Bulkeley’s asset schedule, totaled at $45.00, indicated that the seventy-six year old veteran had
little means, and that he was incapable of earning a steady income (see Table 2). On June 27, 1820,
the New London County Court’s assessment of Bulkeley’s asset schedule revealed that he owned
“50 acres of rough poor land lying in the North part of Lyme,” forty dollars’ worth of “notes and
money,” among other possessions, such as a gun and a crop saw. Bulkeley declared that he was
“Justus Blinn to Hartford County Court, August 1, 1820,” Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land
Warrant Application Files, (NARA microfilm publication M804, 2,670 rolls), Records of the Department of
Veterans Affairs, Record Group 15, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (accessed www.ancestry.com on August
31, 2017).
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unable to work on account of his “age, a rupture, and other infirmities.”215 Although Bulkeley had
never been married, he disclosed that following the death of his sister, he had been living with a
man who was previously married to one of his nieces. Bulkeley’s written declaration and asset
schedule, like so many others, exposed that the Federal Government’s entitlement insufficiently
improved his social and economic livelihood.
Following the abatement of Commutation certificates, due to the incalculable specie value
of the notes, many low-to-middle income officers could not escape the recession brought about by
the war. Due to the labor market’s shortage in Connecticut, a number of officers were pressed to
find work in conjunction with paying off public and private debts, as well as battling deflated
prices on goods and services. However, the formation of the Ohio Company, a land speculation
business organized to help colonists buy property in the Ohio River Valley, enabled officers to
purchase property by exchanging their unpredictable securities for land. In May of 1787, Congress
arranged for the sale of 1.5 million acres in the Northwest Territory to the Ohio Company for one
million dollars in securities at par value.216 While this opportunity was a case of noblesse oblige,
officers who had already sold their securities, or did not have the desire to leave their communities,
did not receive an opportunity for financial assistance until the Pension Act of 1818. Samuel Gibbs,
a merchant from Norwalk, received a total entitlement of $216.00.217 According to an affidavit
“John Bulkeley Affidavit to New London County Court, June 27, 1820,” Revolutionary War Pension
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recorded by the Fairfield County Court on July 25, 1820, Gibbs served for six years in a regiment
commanded by Colonel Samuel Wyllys. The court administrators determined that the total value
of the sixty-three-year-old’s assets stood at $47.86, and included six “Windsor chairs,” two “old
tables,” six “earthen plates,” as well as an ox, three swine, and a cow (see Table 2). Although
Gibbs’ possessions did not translate to affluence, the amount he received from the Office of War
Department begs the question as to why he was entitled to such a large payment in comparison to
his fellow Connecticut Continental officers.218
The Office of War Department’s impartial assessment of applicants’ financial sufferings
led to inequitable remunerations among the Connecticut Line’s surviving officers. Although the
value of Gibbs’ assets were $2.86 higher than the market price of Bulkeley’s possessions, Gibbs
received an entitlement worth $118 more than Bulkeley (see Table 2). While Bulkeley’s and
Gibbs’ asset valuations were relatively similar, a comparison between their declarations for
assistance as well as their possessions indicates that Bulkeley should have received a greater
entitlement from the Federal Government. While Bulkeley resided on several acres, his other assets
suggested that the land was not feasible for cultivation, dwelling developments, nor readily
accessible to the maritime commerce community along Long Island Sound. Bulkeley’s age and
physical impairments prevented him from earning an income or escaping his indigence.219 On the
contrary, Gibbs’ financial despair seems to have stemmed from speculative business dealings.
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According to Gibbs’ affidavit, his indebtedness was due to “an unexpected series of misfortune.”
Gibbs went on to state that in order to come to terms with his business creditors, he “resigned the
whole of my property into their hands.”220 Despite the different paths that led to their poverty, a
comparison between Blakeley and Gibbs reveals a stark payment discrepancy. Furthermore, this
example of inequitable entitlements signaled that the Office of War Department’s assessment
strategy was incalculable. Because assessors did not properly determine the extent of applicants’
poverty, and the degree of their financial despair, the Federal Government created a hollow, and a
partial way toward assessing veterans’ needs.
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AFTERWORD

When the Battle of Lexington and Concord erupted in 1775, many wealthy landholding
men, such as Samuel Holden Parsons, believed that their social standing and political relationships
would enable them to quickly ascend to leadership positions in the Continental Army. Parsons, a
Harvard-educated delegate of the Connecticut General Assembly used his political network to his
advantage and became a Major-General for the Connecticut Line in less than five years after he
was appointed a Brigadier-General in August 1776. While Parsons had no military experience, his
wealth and his Harvard colleagues, particularly John Adams, paved the way for his success.221 On
the contrary, a number of indigent citizens, such as Aaron Austin, enlisted not on the desire to
elevate their social status, but to take up arms for expectations of financial stability and communal
safety. While poverty-stricken farmers and mechanics undoubtedly feared that by joining the
Continental Army they could jeopardize the well-being of their families and their financial
security, men like Austin believed their service led to compensations in property, goods, and
money. Yet, for many, service brought indigence. A close examination of Connecticut soldiers’
affidavits, asset valuations, and pension records exemplified the Connecticut Line’s social and
221
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wealth disparities. Case study comparisons among poor farmers and urban mechanics brings to
question whether or not a number of beneficiaries’ entitlements were really worth the price of their
blood. In a way, the inconsistencies among service entitlements personified the extent of the
public’s wealth gap, and the social and economic imbalances between the haves and the have-nots
during the Revolution. An evaluation of the Connecticut Line’s social and economic diversity
allowed for a closer look at these inequities.
During the war, not all Connecticut soldiers received the same provisions as others. Joseph
Plumb Martin chronicled how commanders did not equitably distribute clothing, food, and
payments among enlisted men. While the Connecticut Line’s commanders promised soldiers
rations of meat, flour, garments, and specie, Martin noted that many enlistees, himself included,
never received these assurances.222 To make matters worse, all soldiers did not receive necessary
medical treatment. Dr. Albigence Waldo’s journal entries revealed that many soldiers’ sufferings
were undeserved, because a number of the Connecticut Line’s commanders improperly controlled
the treatment of wounds and the prevention of contagious illnesses, such as smallpox. From 1775
to 1782, Continentals were vulnerable to a smallpox epidemic due to the fact that a majority did
not know how to prevent the spread of viral infections without proper medical prevention.223 In
conjunction with commanders’ skewed material rationing techniques, medical inequities deprived
many soldiers.
As peace with Britain started to become a reality, many poor farmers and urban mechanics
struggled to escape poverty, a tight labor market, and persistent deflation. While state legislatures
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attempted to ameliorate private creditors’ debt burdens, droves of impoverished veterans were
forgotten. The lack of specie in circulation led a number of Connecticut veterans to sell
preemptively under-valued government bonds to profit-hungry speculators. To augment the
Connecticut state legislature’s abrupt attempt at monetary contraction, the state’s regressive tax
system inflated ordinary Americans’ debts. As consumer purchasing power contracted, and
deflation persisted, a number of poor farmers and urban mechanics descended into further
impoverishment, and failed to receive any financial support until the passage of the Federal
Pension Act of 1818. And while the Commutation Act eventually failed, Congress’s haphazard
effort to allocate service payments only to Continental officers brought social standing into the
limelight for future entitlement statutes.224 Following the ratification of the Revolutionary
entitlement legislation, men like Edward Fuller and Justus Blinn proved their poverty, under oath,
in written testimony that discussed their poor health and economic instability. Yet these men, along
with many others, received insufficient payments for their services due to assessors’ inability to
properly evaluate their needs, and understand their deserved remunerations.
An aggregation of thirty-six Connecticut Continentals’ pension records reveal that the
Office of War Department failed to properly allocate entitlements to the elderly, indigent farmers
and urban mechanics. While the public assistance legislation for aged and impoverished veterans
was unprecedented, the execution of the act was partial in that a number of the most povertystricken beneficiaries received insubstantial benefits. Following the passage of the 1818
entitlement legislation and the apparent inequities among recipients, Congressional delegates
debated whether or not Revolutionary veterans’ pensions should be interpreted by policymakers
as a legally binding debt, or munificence. In a speech to Congress on April 1, 1820, New
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Hampshire Representative Clifton Clagett appealed to his fellow Congressmen concerning this
quandary. Regardless of whether or not they believed a soldier’s pension was a legally binding
contract that had to be properly indemnified by the Federal Government, Clagett argued that a
veteran had “a vested right in his pension for life.”225 While a number of surviving soldiers
persistently demanded more substantial payments, and many Congressional delegates advocated
that service pensions should be interpreted as a contractual obligation with surviving veterans,
revisions to the 1818 act failed in large part due to the Panic of 1819 and growing sectional
politics.226 Eventually, in May 1828, a divided Congress ratified the Pension Act of 1828, a
revision of the 1818 statute that authorized full pay for life to surviving officers and soldiers. This
new statute did not require applicants to demonstrate poverty, and entrusted the allocation of
benefits from the Office of War Department to the Treasury Department.227 Despite these
legislative efforts to bestow more equitable entitlements among surviving Continentals,
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Congressional delegates failed to create a just entitlement program for nearly forty-five years after
the Revolutionary War.
The Office of War Department’s inability to objectively assess applicants’ degree of
financial indigence led to middling men like Elias Stevens receiving greater pension payments
than impoverished veterans, such as George Batterson. Men like Batterson suffered far more than
Stevens from inflationary market forces, and the lack of financial assistance. By the time Congress
devised a service entitlement act that sought to compensate soldiers for the remainder of their lives,
without demonstrating the extent of their poverty through asset valuations, the majority of povertystricken farmers and mechanics neared the end of their lives.
Yet, despite the fact that the total expenditure for this social policy was estimated at
$5,368,275 by start of 1833, Congress continued to expand the entitlement legislation to widows,
and eventually orphans.228 On May 2, 1850, Lucy Clewley Martin, the widow of Joseph Plumb
Martin, started to receive a payment of $96 per year from the Department of Treasury. According
to her pension record file, monthly payments of $8 arrived at her residence in Belfast, Maine until
her death on April 30, 1857. A closer look at Joseph Plumb Martin’s 1820 affidavit allows for a
careful analysis as to whether or not Lucy’s entitlement was adequate. Prior to appearing in court
to receive a service pension, Martin voyaged to Maine and was one of the first settlers of Prospect.
After entering into a land dispute battle with Henry Knox, the first Secretary of War, Martin was
unable to pay a land appraisal, and eventually fell into financial despair.229 On July 7, 1820, Martin
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appeared before the County Court of Hancock, and stated that he had “no real nor personal estate
nor any income [whatsoever].”230 Besides his “necessary bedding and wearing apparel,” two cows,
six sheep, and one pig, the sixty-year old did not have any other possessions. Ultimately, the court
administrators valued Martin’s assets at $52. Because of his age, and his “infirmity,” Martin was
unable to earn a living as a farmer, support his “sickly and rheumatic” wife, nor look after his five
children. While Martin could have hoped for a monthly entitlement sum greater than $8, he was
grateful for the service payment granted by the Office of War Department, and stated that the
entitlement allowed him to provide more support for himself and his family.231
On September 3, 1850, the seventy-four year old widow appeared before Honorable Joseph
Miller, probate judge for Waldo County, and sought to receive a widowhood pension. On July 29,
1848, Congress enacted legislation that sought to recompense “the widows of all officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians, soldiers, mariners, or marines, and Indian spies” who served in
the Revolutionary War. According to the statute, a widow could legally receive her deceased
husband’s monthly payment.232 Lucy received a per annum payment of $96 from 1850 until her
death in 1857. While there are no personal records of Lucy’s experience as a pension recipient,
her determination to meet with the Probate Judge for Waldo County and activate her entitlement
claim revealed that her family’s stability depended on her husband’s pension. By receiving the
same pension rate as her deceased husband, perhaps Lucy was able to receive some short-term
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relief for her rheumatism, as well as protect her children if they were to fall into financial
despair.233
Despite this unprecedented revision to the United States’ social policy legislation for
Revolutionary veterans, it is difficult to dismiss the fact that these entitlements were far overdue.
In addition to the inequitable allocation shortcomings of the Pension Act of 1818, legislators
neglected the financial state of many ordinary Americans in order to secure economic and political
sovereignty. State legislatures, and the Continental Congress, struggled to pay for the war against
Great Britain due to the lack of domestic and private creditors, as well as the existence of no
domestic banks. The Continental Congress’s introduction of paper money, known as
“continentals,” in 1774 allowed state legislators to rely on a fiat currency to stimulate commerce,
and as a microcredit mechanism to tax colonists indirectly.234 However, the value of paper money
degraded. Due to early British victories along the Hudson Valley in 1776, many citizens lost
confidence in this paper money and believed that specie was a more dependable, yet scarce,
medium of exchange. In an effort to impede the hyperinflation caused by the continual issuance of
continentals in circulation, Congressional delegates and state legislators eventually restricted the
supply of fiat currency to pay off the war debts. However, legislators’ reduction of bills of credit
brought on regressive taxes, unyielding deflation, and an undependable medium of exchange.235
As specie remained scarce throughout the late-eighteenth century, a number of low-to-middle
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income Connecticut veterans faced unsettling tax burdens. Despite Congressional efforts to restore
the nation’s public credit, many poor farmers and urban mechanics struggled to escape the
Continental Army’s skewed rationing techniques, a debilitating recession, and entitlement
inequities. While the Federal Government eventually established a banking system that allowed
the United States to build its economy, a number of impoverished farmers, blacksmiths, and day
laborers, remained neglected.

